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ABSTRACT
Schwartz, Daniel H. Ph.D., Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology,
Wright State University, 2008. Exploring Team Dynamics: The Evolution of
Coordination in a Complex Command and Control Environment.

The present study explores the dynamic and emergent behavior of two teams, separately
working through a synthetic task environment representing a battle management
command and control domain under two levels of organizational centralization. While
the manipulation of centralization had minimal effects on overall performance, evidence
suggested that the need to seek authorization for actions from a central authority was a
source of frustration. Both teams adapted over time, changing patterns of coordination to
better meet the task demands. The results are discussed in the context of the concepts of
normal accidents, high reliability organizations, and self-organization in complex
organizations. Specific parallels between sensemaking in organization and perceptualmotor coordination (i.e., collaborative structures and smart mechanisms) are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 1994, two United States Air Force F-15s shot down two United
States Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters over Northern Iraq during Operation Provide
Comfort (Snook, 2000). The weather was clear, the electronic systems seemed
functional, and the people involved were all highly trained and relatively experienced.
The two Blackhawk helicopters were ferrying high-level personnel in and out of the NoFly Zone (NFZ) of Northern Iraq while two F-15 aircraft were performing the first ‘clean
sweep’ of the NFZ for the day, identifying low-flying targets. An Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS; a surveillance and command and control (C2) aircraft that
supports tactical and defensive fighter forces; Boeing, 2006) intermittently monitored the
Blackhawk helicopters that were inside their Area of Responsibility (AOR) and
ostensibly maintained command authority over the F-15s engagements. However, at the
time of the ‘clean sweep’, the AWACS did not know where the Blackhawks were, and
they had not informed the F-15 pilots of their potential presence. Ultimately, the F-15s
misidentified the Blackhawk helicopters as Russian Hinds flown by Iraqis and shot them
down, killing twenty-six people.
The AWACS mission crew were responsible for identifying, tracking, and
controlling all aircraft flying through their AOR; for coordinating air re-fueling; for
providing airborne threat warning and control in the AOR; and for providing
surveillance, detection, and identification of all unknown aircraft (Levenson, Allen, &
Storey, 2002). During the friendly fire episode mentioned above, multiple agents had
confusing, overlapping responsibilities, and, with the addition of situation ambiguities,
coordination failure ensued (Snook, 2000).
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The situational complexities facing military teams in dynamic, time-sensitive
environments such as AWACS environments require a high level of coordination in order
to effectively manage an active battlespace. In addition to coordinating agent
interdependencies, AWACS teams must manage pre-specified task and resource
interdependencies, and adapt to unpredictable and ambiguous situations, such as those
that led up to the friendly fire incident. Indeed, the friendly fire incident highlights the
importance of managing both predictable and unpredictable organizational contingencies.
To avoid similar military or comparable organizational disasters, it is crucial to
understand how teams cope with uncertainties pertaining to system constraints,
environmental variability, and agent interdependence.
The friendly fire event discussed above reveals the complexity of team-based C2
systems. The AWACS command and control work domain is part of a category of
environments wherein social systems and technological systems are tightly interrelated
(also known as socio-technical systems; Trist and Bamforth, 1951). The tight
interrelationship between social and technological dimensions coupled with complex and
dynamic, or continuously changing situations creates work domains that must be highly
reliable and that can quickly adapt to varying contingencies. The first step in ensuring
(i.e., designing, developing, evaluating) reliable and effective socio-technical systems is
understanding the dynamics that form effective and ineffective system (e.g., team)
functioning. Specifically, an understanding of how agents reliably learn and manage
organizational constraints provides the foundation for designing, supporting, and
protecting safety critical socio-technical systems. This research is an attempt to
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understand how teams manage dynamic uncertainty within a complex socio-technical
domain – AWACS C2.
The following chapters approach managing organizational complexity as a
problem of control. Specifically, highly reliable organizations cope with the demands of
complex control problems by developing and utilizing effective control strategies.
Chapter 2 discusses two approaches that seek to achieve a deeper understanding of the
control demands of complex work domains: Normal Accident Theory (NAT) research
and research involving High Reliability Organizations (HRO). Norman Accident Theory
provides the foundation for defining complexity whereas HROs represent systems that
are successful at continuously coping with complexity. It is argued that both perspectives
are relevant to understanding the nature of complex control problems and solutions.
Although, NAT and HROs define complexity and characterize systems capable of
reliably coping with uncertainty, neither approach elaborates on how organizations
stabilize through complex and changing situations. Chapter 3 explores the role of
sensemaking (i.e., continuous learning) as an adaptive process of stabilizing complex
work domains. Several interrelated theories of learning are presented that illustrate how
organizations continuously learn to manage complexity and instability. Specifically,
theories of action and sensemaking are discussed as processes whereby organizations
continuously learn reliable strategies for coping with dynamic situations.
Given the complexity of socio-technical systems such as the AWACS, particular
scrutiny is given to the investigative research methods utilized to understand how
stability is maintained. Thus, Chapter 4 discusses the emergent complexity of the
AWACS C2 domain, the limitations of traditional (i.e., reductionistic) scientific methods,
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and the inherent difficulty in conducting empirical research onboard an active AWACS
platform during battle management. Synthetic task environments (STE) are presented as
pragmatic means of representing the relevant dimensions of the AWACS C2 work
domain while maintaining a moderate degree of experimental control. Consequently, this
research utilizes a synthetic task environment (STE) and AWACS mission scenarios,
both based on cognitive work analyses (CWA) of the AWACS C2 work domain and a
subject matter expert.
Chapter 5 explores quantitative and qualitative data patterns associated with
continuous learning from both teams. Additionally, analyses and results are discussed
relating to the effects of organizational centralization (centralization vs de-centralization)
on performance and perceived workload. Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the implications of
this study for the study, design, and development of socio-technical systems.
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CHAPTER 2: NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY AND HIGH RELIABILITY
ORGANIZAIONS
The following chapter explores two complementary approaches to
conceptualizing complex socio-technical systems – Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and
High Reliability Organizational theory (HRO). Normal Accident Theory defines
organizational complexity and highlights the necessity and difficulty of coping with
uncertainty, whereas HROs represent systems that are successful at managing
complexity. Both approaches are considered with the goal of achieving a deeper
understanding of the control demands of complex work domains and the implications for
organizational sensemaking.
Normal (i.e., inevitable) accidents are a characteristic feature of many complex
systems (Perrow, 1984). A system is defined as an assemblage of interrelated elements or
units that comprise an instrumental whole. An accident is a failure in a system “…that
damages more than one unit and in doing so disrupts the ongoing or future output of the
system” (Perrow, 1984; p. 66). Normal accident theory (NAT) focuses on the properties
of specific systems that have potential for failure and how such systems recover from
failure. However, NAT is limited in its conception of safety-critical systems vulnerable
to so-called normal accidents.
High reliability organizations (HROs) represent an alternative conception of
safety-critical organizations (i.e., used synonymously with the term ‘system’) that
manage to avoid catastrophic failure (i.e., normal accidents) despite the presence of
uncertainty and complexity (Roberts & Bea, 2001). While the NAT and HRO
perspectives at first seem to be contradictory, both perspectives are relevant to
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understanding the nature of complex control problems and the potential solutions to these
problems (e.g., Snook, 2000; Marais, Dulac, & Levinson, 2004).
Normal Accident Theory
According to Perrow (1984), complex systems exhibit both multifarious
interactions and tight coupling as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Normal accidents are typically
associated with systems in the upper right quadrant of the Interaction/Coupling chart.
(e.g., nuclear power, chemical processes, genetic engineering). To consider why Perrow
believes that accidents are inevitable in these systems, it is important to understand the
dimensions of the space in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Interaction/Coupling chart where Quadrant 2 reflects the
conditions that lead to normal accidents (Perrow, 1984, p. 97).
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Interactions. The interaction-dimension of Perrow’s space contrasts ‘linear’ with
‘complex’ systems. Where a linear system is one where the causal chains are relatively
simple, making it possible to extrapolate both forward (to anticipate hazards) and
backward (to diagnose faults). Dams and assembly lines are examples of systems
dominated by linear interactions. At the other end of the continuum, a complex system is
one where the causal chains are more convoluted (e.g., involving bifurcations and
feedback loops) that make it more difficult to anticipate the consequences of an action
and more difficult to trace back to identify the causes of a failure. Nuclear power plants
and universities are presented as systems where interactions are complex. The accident at
Three-Mile Island exemplifies a complex interaction that made it difficult to correctly
diagnose a failure and thus to prevent a ‘normal accident.’
Coupling. The coupling dimension of Perrow’s space contrasts ‘tight’ with
‘loose’ coupling. Tight coupling indicates that there is no slack or buffer between
components to prevent a problem in one part of the system from cascading to create a
larger problem within the system. Dams and nuclear power plants are examples of
tightly coupled systems. In such systems it is possible for a small leak in one component
to cascade, leading to a catastrophic system failure. In loosely coupled systems, there are
typically buffers (or, perhaps what Rochlin (1993) later refers to as ‘friction’) that can
prevent the loss of the kingdom from the loss of a nail. Assembly line production
systems and universities illustrate systems with loose couplings. For example in
assembly lines, buffers along the line can help to prevent problems with machinery at one
station from bringing the whole line to a halt. In universities, departments and even
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faculty within departments tend to function almost as independent agents, so that a failure
of one department or one professor has little impact on the overall integrity of the system.
According to NAT, different conclusions can be made about systems plotted
across the array in Figure 2.1. For example, universities are loosely coupled systems that
exhibit relatively complex interactions. Thus, if something goes wrong, there are many
potential solutions and there is time for recovery. Moreover, if something goes wrong,
there are many unexpected interactions that transcend departments and roles (e.g.,
administrators, professors, students). On the other hand, nuclear power plants represent
systems that are both tightly coupled and that exhibit complex interactions.
Consequently, when something goes wrong in a nuclear power plant, there could be
many unexpected and unforeseen interactions that transcend subsystems. Additionally,
when failure occurs within a nuclear power plant, tight coupling (i.e., a lack of flexibility)
limits the potential for corrective action increasing the possibility that an error will
cascade. Thus, catastrophic accidents are a characteristic feature of systems that are
tightly coupled and exhibit complex interactions (e.g., nuclear power plants; Perrow,
1984).
Systems characterized by both tight coupling and high interactive complexity,
such as nuclear power plants, are inherently vulnerable to normal accidents (Perrow,
1984). However, as seen in the friendly-fire incident described earlier, complex systems
with relatively loose coupling and high complexity also experience so-called normal
accidents. Indeed, NAT focuses almost exclusively on complex systems based on
relatively predictable and stable physical laws (and therefore tight coupling) as opposed
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to complex systems based on relatively unpredictable ecological dynamics and emergent
behavior (where the couplings tend to be looser).
Re-Conceptualizing Normal Accidents
A problem with Perrow’s space for characterizing systems is the two dimensions
that characterize complex systems. Interactive complexity (i.e., failures in two or more
discrete parts can interact in unexpected ways) and tight coupling (i.e., one part has high
impact on another part) appear to be overlapping concepts. The degree to which two
discrete parts interact in unexpected ways depends to some extent on the nature of the
coupling between components. In other words, if a system’s components have relatively
little impact on other system components (i.e., loose coupling) then interactions may be
minimized, but also these interactions can become more complex from the stand point of
modeling and prediction. However, if a system’s components greatly impact other
components within the system, then interactive complexity will be high. Perhaps,
Perrow’s dimensions of interaction and coupling could be collapsed into a single
dimension to reflect the nature of interactions between system components. Tight
coupling would refer to ‘linear’ relations among the components so that the interactions
between components are proportional or additive. Thus, the interactions are of the type
that can, at least in principle, be modeled using typical linear principles and normative
logic. Loose coupling would refer to systems with ‘nonlinear’ interactions that lead to
emergent effects that are difficult to model using conventional normative assumptions.
Even when the interactions are ‘linear’ the system can be difficult to model if the
number of components or dimensions becomes large (e.g., chess is an example where the
combinations of possibilities challenge closed form optimal solutions and heuristics play
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an important role even in artificially intelligent systems). A second dimension that would
be related to the overall complexity and thus, controllability of a system would be simply
the number of components or parts. This suggests a second dimension for characterizing
systems that will be identified as the ‘dimensionality’ of the system, as illustrated in
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Figure 2.2, which is proposed as an alternative to Perrow’s model.

Figure 2.2. This is an alternative to Perrow’s (1984) interaction/coupling
chart. The vertical axis reflects the number of dimensions of the system
and the horizontal axis represents the degree of coupling.
Whereas Perrow’s space has complexity as a dimension of one axis (interaction),
the alternative illustrated in Figure 2.2 envisions complexity as a joint function of the two
dimensions. Complexity depends on both the number of dimensions and on the nature of
the coupling among dimensions. The more dimensions a system has, the more complex it
will be. For a given number of dimensions complexity further depends on the nature of
the coupling, with linear systems being generally less complex than nonlinear systems.
Thus, complexity increases along the diagonal from the lower left corner (few
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dimensions, linear coupling) to the upper right corner (many dimensions, nonlinear
couplings).
The space illustrated in Figure 2.2 suggests three qualitative regions that have
some relevance for the fundamental nature of the control logic or rationality. In low
dimensional, tightly coupled systems, it is possible to specify the causal relations using
normative, linear models. This region has been labeled the region of synoptic rationality
(Lindblom, 1957). In the synoptic range, it is possible to specify optimal solutions base
on classical engineering or economic analyses. When systems exhibit higher
dimensionality and looser coupling, the assumptions of classical economic rationality
may not be met or the solutions become intractable. In this range, control might be
achieved using simplifying heuristics typical of what Simon (1957) called bounded
rationality. However, as the complexity of the system increases, it becomes more and
more likely that these heuristics will be defeated by unanticipated variability. Thus, a
critical question that Perrow’s analysis anticipates is the question of complexity. At what
point, does complexity grow to a point where accidents due to unanticipated variability
will be inevitable (i.e., normal)?
Note that the emergent dimension of complexity in Figure 2.2 is not necessarily
synonymous with the stability of the system. As we will see, the overall system can be
partitioned into the control ‘problem’ or the ‘demands’ of the work domain and the
control ‘solution’ or the control ‘strategy.’ The control strategy reflects the
organizational and human resources and the associated automatic control systems and
decision technologies that support them. To a large extent, the stability of the
organization will depend on the relationship between the demands of the work domain
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(i.e., requisite variety; Ashby, 1956) and the degrees of freedom in the controller or
control organization. As Ashby notes, variety destroys variety. Thus, a very complex
organization, such as a university, can be stable if the variety in the control organization
offsets the variety associated with the control problem or work demands. On the other
hand, when the flexibility of the control organization is less than the variability of the
work demands, the total system may be ‘brittle’ as reflected in Vicente’s (1999) striking
example of the case of “malicious procedural compliance.” In that case, exactly following
procedures (working to rules) led to an infinite loop in an exercise in a nuclear simulator.
The point of this example is that the procedures for control did not anticipate the
variability of the work demands. This leads naturally to the research on high reliability
organizations (HRO). In an important sense, a HRO is an organization that is able to
achieve stability by matching the variability associated with the complexity of work
demands through a comparable complexity (flexibility) in the control organization.
High-Reliability Organizations
As opposed to investigating systems to determine how they can, or eventually
will, catastrophically fail (i.e., Normal Accident Theory), scientists that study high
reliability organizations (HRO) seek to gain insights into how complex organizations
succeed (i.e., manage to avoid catastrophic accidents) despite the challenges of having to
deal with a complex problem with many components and the potential for nonlinear
interactions (Weick & Roberts, 1993). In other words, HRO researchers attempt to
understand complex, loosely coupled, and unstable systems that are defined by their
resilience to error. Indeed, many of the systems that HRO scientists study do not fall
within the quadrant of Perrow’s space where normal accidents are to be expected due to
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loose coupling. AWACS, for example, are successful because their systems are
intentionally loosely coupled in order to afford flexible opportunities for control.
Additionally, AWACS systems are designed with built-in redundancies (e.g., redundant
visual displays; open-radio channels; confirmation policies) wherein Weapons Directors
can spot potential errors in other operators’ behavior. Further, AWACSs’ Air Tasking
Orders that list all planned airborne activity in an area of responsibility (AOR) are
coupled with aircraft identification of friend or foe (IFF) systems and fighter aircraft
visual contact policies to ensure that mistakes, like the friendly fire incident mentioned
above, do not occur. However, despite loose coupling, complex organizations like
AWACS are clearly vulnerable to so-called normal accidents as illustrated by the friendly
fire accident described by Snook and others (Shrader, 2005; Regan, 2004).
Laporte (1996) argues that HROs are a source of important lessons for how all
organizations can minimize error and adapt to high demands. For example, HROs
support an organizational culture of mindfulness. Weick and colleagues define
mindfulness as an “enriched awareness…[through] active differentiation and refinement
of existing categories and distinctions…creation of new discontinuous categories out of
the continuous stream of events… and a more nuanced appreciation of context and
alternative ways to deal with it” (1999; p. 90). The authors argue that mindfulness is the
foundation for high reliability organizing because people in HROs attempt to ‘see’ more,
make better sense of what they ‘see’, and remain attuned to their current situation (Weick
& Sutcliffe, 2001).
Weick and Suttcliffe (2001) have discovered five attention-related processes that
repeatedly emerge from analyzing HROs: 1) a preoccupation with failure/mistakes (e.g.,
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constantly thinking about ‘missing something’), 2) a reluctance to simplify complexity
(e.g., thinking about all possible failure modes), 3) sensitivity to operations (e.g.,
understanding the constraints inherent to process control), 4) a commitment to resilience
(e.g., improvising and acting without knowing immediate consequences), and 5) a respect
for expertise (e.g., letting decisions make their way to those with appropriate expertise to
make them; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The authors note that organizations that are not
mindful develop ‘blindspots’ in their attention to the aforementioned HRO processes.
Examples of events that emerged from organizations failing to be mindful include the
Columbia accident (NASA, 2003), the friendly fire incident over Northern Iraq (Snook,
2001), and the hurricane Katrina catastrophe (Independent Levee Investigation Team,
2006).
The quantity of HROs that do not fall within the ‘significant’ zone of Perrow’s
dimensional space is large and represents organizations that are critical to understand due
to safety (e.g., air traffic control) and mission concerns (e.g., AWACS). The above reconceptualization of Perrow’s complexity space (Figure 2.2) renders HROs as complex
systems of critical concern. (To be sure, due to many degrees of freedom and loose
coupling, attempts to understand the dynamics of HROs is rare compared with tightly
coupled systems based on predictable physical laws [i.e., systems of critical concern for
Perrow]). However, while observations and descriptions of HRO’s suggest that stable
control is possible in complex work domains, it is very difficult to generalize from these
observations without considering more fundamental aspects of control systems. Thus,
the next section will consider the relation between complexity and stability in the context
of a control perspective.
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Control Systems
Control Problems vs Control Solutions
Control is a relation of constraint of one element by another (e.g., the pilot
controls the aircraft). Control systems, such as HROs, can be differentiated into control
problems and control solutions, wherein the control problem refers to the computational
demands of a work domain and the control solution refers to the organizational strategies
for meeting those demands. There are several, simple examples to make this important
differentiation clear: process-control in nuclear power plants (i.e., control problem) is
addressed through different power plant designs (i.e., control solutions); There are 32
different teams (i.e., control solutions) that play football (i.e., control problem) in the
National Football League; there are four ‘Big’ international accountancy and professional
service organizations (i.e., control solutions) that handle most audits for publicly traded
companies (i.e., control problem). From these examples, it should be clear that the
control problem and control solution transact to form the particular organization or
system under consideration (e.g., CANDU Nuclear Power Plants, the NY Giants, Ernst &
Young Accountancy). In other words, any particular organization or system includes
both those constraints arising from the functional problem or work domain and those
constraints arising from the people and automated systems that regulate processes within
that domain - the stability of the total system will depend on the fit between these two
system components.
Focusing on the control problem without considering the control solution, or visa
versa, is a critical mistake when attempting to understand organizations. For example,
when attempting to understand the corporate accounting services firm Ernst & Young as
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a system, it may be valuable to distinguish between the demands associated with
corporate accounting (that pose challenges for any corporate accounting firm) and the
specific constraints associated with the Ernst & Young organization. In this sense, the
Ernst & Young organization reflects one of potentially many solutions that might satisfy
the demands of this work domain. In a formative analysis, one might evaluate how good
a fit the Ernst & Young organization is to the work demands. This may require
comparisons between the Ernst & Young organization and other organizations (e.g.,
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers) and/or it might require comparisons to normative (i.e.,
average or expected) control strategies derived from analysis of the work demands
independent of any existing solution
When considering a successful control solution in relation to a particular control
problem (i.e., a specific organization or system), it is useful to think about how a key
unlocks a door. A key (i.e., control solution) for unlocking a door (i.e., control problem),
acts on a specific lock within a particular door (i.e., characteristics of the ‘work domain’).
In order to open the lock, the key must have sufficient ‘variety’ in its key-structure to
unlock the particular door (note: the ridges on the key). Indeed, according to the law of
requisite variety, “the variety in the control system must be equal or larger than the
variety of the perturbations in order to achieve control”, (Ashby, 1958; cited in
Heylighen, 1992). Thus, the variety of any control solution (e.g., door key, organization)
must at least match that of the control problem (e.g., door lock, work domain). However,
unlike the key metaphor, where the requisite variety is fixed in time, in many natural
work demands the demands will vary over time and meeting these demands will require a
key that can change (i.e., adapt) to fluctuating demands.

16

Ashby (1956; 11.4 ex. 4) provides a ‘real-world’ example of the law of requisite
variety:
A guest is coming to dinner, but the butler does not know who. He knows only
that it may be Mr A, who drinks only sherry or wine, Mrs B who drinks only gin
or brandy, or Mr C who drinks only red wine, brandy, or sherry. In the cellar he
finds he has only whisky, gin, and sherry. Can he find something acceptable to
the guest, whoever comes?
He can get by, but if a hypothetical Ms D turns up, who drinks only wine or
brandy, he can't cope and will be out on his ear, as indeed he should be: what
kind of butler has no wine in the cellar?

In Ashby’s example, the guests represent the control problem whereas the butler
together with his cellar of resources represents the control solution. Unfortunately for the
butler, he does not have a sufficient variety of alcohol to accommodate all the
possibilities. Thus, in this case, the control solution will eventually fail – and the butler
will face the consequences.
It is important to reiterate that organization, as a whole, represents the relation of
constraint of a work domain (i.e., control problem; e.g., corporate accounting) by a
particular control solution (e.g., Ernst & Young). In order to consider how the variability
in control solutions fit with the demands of control problems, each component must be
further parsed into three classes of constraint: value constraints, action constraints, and
information constraints (See Figure 2.3).
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Organization
Control Problem

Action

regulatory
constraints

Information

structure of
feedback

VARIETY

Value consequences

Control Solution
goals,
Value
intentions,
expectations
what can be
done?

Action

what can be
controlled?

Information

Figure 2.3. The overall system is partitioned into the problem and solution
and each of these components is further partitioned to reflect three
qualitatively different sources of constraint: values, actions, and
information.
Value Constraints
Value constraints, to a certain extent, provide the fundamental reason why a
system is of interest – that is, they reflect the purpose of the system. On the problem side
of the equation this reflects the possible consequences for good or ill. For example, in a
power plant some of the consequences would include the energy and the waste produced,
the resources consumed, the likelihood and consequences of accidents, and the
economics in terms of potential costs and profits. On the solution side of the equation
this reflects the intentions or goals of the organization. This might reflect organizational
priorities in terms of profits and risks that are deemed desirable or acceptable. It could
also reflect specific targets for production, profit, or safety. It should be fairly obvious
that the stability of the system will in part depend on the relation between the possible
consequences (e.g., the likelihood of accidents and the costs associated with those
accidents) and the priorities of the organization (e.g., the attitudes toward risk and the
attention given to safety measures). A system operating in a work domain with high risks
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will not survive long if safety is not given a high priority. On the other hand, a system
fixated on avoiding risk at all cost may fail due to economic constraints. Thus, stability
will depend on the ability to find a balance of priorities that matches the balance of
opportunity and risk in the work domain.
Action Constraints
Constraints on action within a work domain represent what the system can do. On
the problem side of the equation, action constraints represent the possible moves or
motions of the system. Typically, the possibilities within the work domain are
constrained by physical laws (e.g., the laws of motion or of mass/energy balances) and by
the regulatory environment (e.g., legal restrictions, and industry/cultural standards of
behavior). On the solution side of the equation, action constraints represent the degrees
of freedom in the organization. This reflects the independence and flexibility of the
organization to make and carry out decisions. For example, in a hierarchical
organization, the degrees of freedom are typically constrained to conform to plans
generated by a centralized decision maker. Alternatively, a heterarchical system gives
more freedom to individuals to react based on local contingencies without authorization
from a central authority. Rochlin (1997) discusses the relative benefits of different styles
of organization within the military domain (e.g., flat, de-centralized organizations versus
vertical heterarchical organizations).
Again, it should be apparent that stability of a system will depend in part on the
match between the possibilities in the problem space and the degrees of freedom of the
control organization. If the degrees of freedom in the organization are more tightly
constrained than the space of possibilities, then some possibilities will be difficult to
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realize and/or difficult to avoid. While increasing degrees of freedom within the
organization will generally increase the sphere of stable possibilities, these increased
degrees of freedom also increase the overall system complexity and can increase the
overall computational demands of control. Here the challenge of stability typically
depends on balancing the number of degrees of freedom against the dimensionality of the
problem space, and the computational demands of control. Runeson’s (1977) concept of
smart mechanism provides an interesting discussion of how biological systems may find
a dynamic balance that allows both flexibility and stability. Specifically, Runeson
suggests that perceptual mechanisms are ‘smart’, meaning that they take advantage of
idiosyncratic, situation-specific circumstances in the interests of efficiency and reliability
in task performance. In other words, smart mechanisms maintain stability by modulating
degrees of freedom relative to situation specific variety.
Thompson’s (1967) classical analysis of organizations has some relevance to the
challenge of managing degrees of freedom within an organization to meet the demands of
the work domain. He described three types of interdependence: pooled interdependence,
sequential interdependence, and reciprocal interdependence. Pooled interdependence
describes a situation where movement in the problem space or work domain depends on a
simple integration of the actions of the individual components (degrees of freedom)
within the organization. While success may depend on a contribution from each degree
of freedom in the organization, the individual degrees of freedom are relatively
independent of each other. This kind of interdependence typically depends on some
degree of standardization that allows the products to ‘add-up’ to reach a common goal.
For example, the contributions of the strength coach, the travel office, and grounds
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keepers are all important to the overall success of a pro football organization. However,
there is minimal coupling in terms of how each does their individual work. Or, consider
a large corporate accounting organization that typically depends on many individual
services (e.g., auditing, assurance and advisory, transaction advisory) that function
independently to satisfy specific problems within the complex work environment.
Standardization of methodologies, tools, and language, regardless of location, is essential
for these components to work together
Sequential interdependence describes a situation where the work demands impose
precedence constraints among the individual degrees of freedom. For instance, some
parts of the organization may not be able to contribute to the systems goals until they
receive products created by other components. For example, in Ernst & Young, the
various service departments (e.g., fraud detection, internal audit) may have to carefully
plan their individual analyses so that different service departments can utilize the
analyzed information (e.g., fraud detection services utilize results from internal audit
services). In the case of combat air operations, fighter aircraft may be required to give
priority to specific enemy targets based on an Air Tasking Order that is disseminated by
an AWACS. This type of interdependence often requires some degree of planning so that
the individuals can all be on the same page – the fighter pilots and the AWACS know
where the priority targets are located and requisite resources are allocated to complete the
mission.
Finally, reciprocal interdependence refers to work domains where “…the outputs
of each [component] become inputs for the others”, (Thompson, 1967; p. 55). Thus,
within reciprocally interdependent work domains, the behavior of each ‘part’ is
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contingent upon the behavior of other parts. In the case of Ernst & Young, success in
managing a major corporation’s tax risk may depend on reciprocal interdependence
between tax risk assessors and internal auditors. That is, each may be forced to adapt to a
changing corporate regulatory environment that may often depend on the ability to
mutually adjust to each other. For example, given the increasing pressures on time and
resources since the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley s404, many tax functions must
manage their risk profile by inter-relating the tax technical skills of the tax function with
the process and controls experience of the internal audit department. Or, in the case of
combat air operations, the ability to respond to an emergent mission, such as rescuing a
downed pilot, may require both the fighter and tanker to go outside the plan and to
mutually adjust to meet the demands of the situation.
Note that the different types of independence (pooled, sequential, and reciprocal)
and the associated coordination demands (standardization, planning, and mutual
adjustment) are typically all involved in the solution of complex problems. Thus, to
some extent each service department of a corporate accounting team makes a pooled
contribution that is relatively independent and that reflects their specific standard skills.
However, these skills are organized according to fixed plans (i.e., functions) that allow
each to synchronize their actions to correspond with the actions of others (e.g., the tax
audit department hands off the results of their analyses to the fraud detection department).
However, these functional relationships typically do not completely specify all the
actions. They typically include options that depend on local contingencies (e.g., changes
in corporate regulatory environment) and that require service departments to make real
time adjustments based on the actions of other departments (e.g., the business tax
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compliance department relying on up-to-date regulatory information from the transaction
tax department). Similarly, the success of air combat operations depends on standardized
connections so the aircraft can mate with the tanker to take on fuel, careful plans to insure
that the necessary fuel required for the missions is available at the right place and the
right time, and the ability for multiple components to adapt in real time to the dynamic
opportunities and threats that were not anticipated in the original plans.
With respect to the complexity space illustrated in Figure 1.2, standardization and
planning will be most useful in the regions of synoptic and bounded rationality and at
least in the region of synoptic rationality these types of coordination may be sufficient.
However, in the region of unanticipated variability, stability will hinge on the capacity
for mutual adjustment. And that leads naturally to the third critical dimension for control,
the dimension of information.
Information Constraints
Information constraints reflect feedback that enables controlled action. That is,
the information constraints will allow actions to be monitored and adjusted relative to the
goals and values of the system. From the problem side of the equation, the information
constraints reflect the distinctions that are available to be measured. What can be known
about the work domain? And most significantly, what information is relevant for
evaluating the state relative to the purposes to be achieved. For example, in the context
of corporate accounting, we are most interested in information that is relative to
satisfying regulatory requirements and ensuring that our tax strategy meets our business
needs. This may involve information about the strengths and weakness of our own
corporate accounting standards and strategies. Is our current tax strategy working or do
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we need to make changes? From the solution side of the equation, the information
constraints reflect the perspicuity and attentiveness of the organization. What aspects of
the work domain is the organization aware of? For example, if an organization’s tax
department fails to take advantage of research and development expenditure credit claims
on expenditure incurred in the year, this may have a real financial impact on the
organization’s current tax charge for the year (as a result of lost tax benefits).
Furthermore, there may be no future opportunity to rectify the error if the relevant
deadline has subsequently passed. A term commonly used to reflect the coupling of these
two constraints is situation awareness. Where high situation awareness is used to
characterize a person or organization who is aware of the critical domain distinctions that
are relevant for critical decisions and low situation awareness reflects a person or
organization who is out of touch or overwhelmed by the information.
It should be clear that the different types of interdependence and coordination
described by Thompson have important implications for the types of information that will
be valuable (i.e., to guide controlled action). Standardization of sequences and plans
achieves coordination through establishing norms, schedules, work processes, and
specific output goals. For example, in order for a car assembly line to function within
standardized organizational output goals, executive operators require information related
to the number of cars coming off the assembly line per day. Similarly, individual process
operators require information regarding specific work process standards (e.g., time
constraints) in order to work according to plan.
The lack of uncertainty and limited degrees of freedom within standardized
organizations limits the dimensionality or variety of meaningful information. Thus,
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information regarding ‘How many?’, ‘How fast?’ are meaningful values for determining
the stability or effectiveness of organizations such as assembly lines. In other words, due
to the relative behavioral predictability of standardized organizations, such as assembly
lines, simple metrics provide practical information related to the relative ‘health’ or
performance of the system. As mentioned above, coordination through standardization
and planning are most useful when a control problem has limited dimensionality and is
relatively predictable (i.e., the region of synoptic rationality). On the other hand, when
work domains are characterized by uncertainty and many degrees of freedom (e.g.,
AWACS), stability and predictability cannot be assured by standardization or by planning
- stability will depend on the capacity for mutual adjustment.
Mutual adjustment achieves coordination through continual integration wherein
agents are jointly responsible for decision-making and outcomes. In other words,
reciprocally interdependent agents work together (e.g., share information, influence) to
reduce uncertainty in order to make better decisions for the ‘common good’. For
example, in combat air operations, AWACS WDs, fighter pilots, and the air operations
center (AOC) must continuously share information related to possible enemy air targets.
Thus, an AWACS radar system may indicate an unknown track within its area of
responsibility. Indeed, the AWACS IFF system identifies the unknown track as an
enemy aircraft. Additionally, the 72-hour air tasking order does not indicate any
scheduled friendly aircraft for that location. Consequently, the AWACS consults the
AOC to determine if any aircraft was recently scheduled to be at that particular location
in the AOR. At the same time, an AWACS WD contacts a friendly fighter to obtain
visual contact with the unknown track to determine, for sure, that it is an enemy target.
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During this time-critical period, the AWACS WDS, the AOC, and the friendly fighter
pilot continuously exchange information regarding the unknown aircraft’s position,
possible identity, and potential actions. The AOC determines that they do not have any
friendly aircraft scheduled to be in that particular location within the AOR during the
next 24-hours. However, through a rapid fly-by, the friendly fighter pilot visually
determines that the unknown track is not an enemy fighter, but a civilian passenger jet
that has veered off its standard course. Later, it is determined that the civilian passenger
jet was attempting to avoid a dangerous weather system.
In combat air operations, each component (e.g., the fighter, AWACS, AOC) must
know what other components are doing, in real-time. For example, prior to ordering a
fighter to shoot down an unknown track, AWACS WDs must determine if the unknown
track is a scheduled friendly outfit that they were not informed of. Consequently, the
AWACS WDs maintain real-time communication with the AOC to ascertain if there were
any errors or omissions in the ATO or, if somewhere up the command line someone
ordered a friendly mission in the area of the unknown track. At the same time, the
AWACS WDs order a fighter aircraft to maintain visual contact with the unknown track
to determine its intent. Under these circumstances, many things can happen – the fighter
might spot a cluster of enemy fighters, wherein the AWACS WDs will rapidly have to
assign fighter reinforcements and inform the AOC; the AOC might establish that a Red
Cross medical airlift was scheduled at the last minute to be in the area, wherein the
AWACs will have to inform the fighter to be extra cautious NOT to fire when conducting
a visual fly-by. Ultimately, each component (i.e., the fighter, the AOC, the AWACS
WDs) is a potential source of unanticipated variability for all other components. This
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variability must be matched by requisite variety in the feedback loop to allow mutual
adjustment.
Voice loops are an example of a feedback loop that allows mutual adjustment
through space shuttle mission control by affording synchronous communication among
spatially distributed agents (Patterson, Watts-Perotti, & Woods, 1999). Voice loops that
are structured around a mission control organization allow agents to listen in on relevant
communication without disrupting their own activities or the activities of others
(Patterson, Watts-Perotti, & Woods, 1999). Additionally, the variety afforded by voice
loops allows agents to coordinate their efforts in real-time, in response to dynamic
situations. If something that is transmitted on the voice loops does not match an agent’s
expectations, attention can be diverted to the discrepancy to investigate potential
problems. For example, if a controller hears about a failure within one subsystem, they
can assess the relative impact on their subsystem and anticipate any actions that might be
required of them. Similarly, an operator can listen in on the relative tempo of
communication through a voice loop to determine the relative workload of other
operators or the status of specific processes. Thus, voice loops support mutual
adjustment by behaving like a dynamic ‘window’ through which processes and activities
of agents and subsystems can be viewed.
In order to design or develop a stable system, the meaningful constraints of the
control problem (i.e., work domain) must be made apparent to the control solution.
Specifically, systemic stability is predicated on the ability of a controller (e.g., agent) to
reduce the discrepancy between feedback about the current state of a system and the
values inherent to the system. Thus, an agent’s control solution for stabilizing a system is

27

based on an understanding of organizational values, feedback representations, and
opportunities to act; i.e., the meaningful constraints of the work domain. One approach
to systematically uncovering what information is significant to stabilize a particular
complex system, such as combat air operations, is Cognitive Systems Engineering.
Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE)
Cognitive Systems Engineering represents an approach to systems design that
utilizes both analysis of work domain constraints (i.e., control problems) and analysis of
potential strategies (i.e., control solutions) to inform the development of process and
technology for human-system integration (i.e., control solutions; Rasmussen, 1994;
Vicente, 1999). The goal of CSE is to improve the fit between work domains and the
people and technologies that manage them. In other words, the goal is to enhance system
stability through improved human systems integration.
Work domain analysis. According to CSE principles, the first step in
understanding a work domain or control problem is to conduct a work domain analysis.
The purpose of a work domain analysis is to develop a functional map of the means-end
relations within a work domain, where the ends reflect the functional purposes and the
means reflect both the action constraints and the information available for guiding that
action. This is accomplished by developing an abstraction hierarchy/decomposition
(Rasmussen, 1994; Vicente, 1999; see Figure 2.4 for an example of an AWACS
abstraction hierarchy). The abstraction hierarchy can be seen as a way to view a complex
system through different levels of magnification – e.g., microscopic – macroscopic. The
abstraction hierarchy is a means-ends description of a system whereby higher-levels
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describe the ‘why’ or higher order functionality of the system, and lower-levels describe
‘how’ or the means through which high-level functions are achieved.

WHY

Functional Purpose

HOW

Abstract Function

Early warning & control of events in assigned area of responsibility

Establish, update, and
Knowledge of regional
disseminate tactical
activities
picture

Exercise control

Preserve platform,
sensors, information
systems

General Function

Detect, track, and
associate

Evaluate tactical
situation

Communicate

Implement protective
measures

Physical Function

Gather data

Store and process
mission data

Exchange information

Provide protection

Radar

Mission processing
computer

Radio voice links

Radar warning
receiver

Physical Form

Figure 2.4. A sample of functions from each layer of an AWACS
abstraction hierarchy (adapted from Naikar, et al., 2000).
The highest level of abstraction is the functional purpose, or the ultimate reason
that the system exists. The highest level delimits ultimate goals to be achieved and
environmental constraints that need to be recognized. For example, the functional
purpose of an AWACS is early warning and control of events in an assigned area of
operations. In other words, within a specified area of responsibility, the AWACSs’ role
is to patrol the air, providing friendly aircraft with early warning about possible threats
and coordinating friendly forces in response to those suspected threats. Specifically, the
AWACS is tasked with ensuring that everything that is within the airspace at any moment
in time has been previously scheduled (according to an air tasking order) and facilitates
the coordination of friendly force functions (e.g., mid-air refueling).
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The next highest level of abstraction is the priorities and values of the system.
This level represents more abstract functions, namely the situation independent values
and priorities that must be adhered to in order to accomplish the functional purpose of the
system. Priorities and values in the AWACS involve maintaining knowledge of activities
within the area of responsibility. Specifically, priorities and values for the AWACS
include establishing, updating, and disseminating tactical information; exercising control
of friendly assets; and protecting friendly assets (i.e., platforms, sensors, and information
systems).
The next level of abstraction delimits the general functions of the system that are
the means whereby measurable priorities and values can be met. In the case of the
AWACS, an important general function is detecting, tracking, and coordinating friendly
assets. This involves continuously evaluating the tactical situation, communicating the
tactical ‘picture’ to friendly parties, and implementing protective measures when
necessary. The general functions of a complex system are supported by specific physical
functions (the next level of abstraction). Physical functions are actual, specific physical
process systems that accomplish a certain role (e.g., gathering data). The lowest level of
the abstraction hierarchy is the physical form level. Physical forms are the entities or the
most micro-level forms that support physical functionality (e.g., AWACS radar).
A part/whole decomposition is a specification of the levels of analysis an analyst
wishes to delineate. For example, a complex system can be broken down into
components and subcomponents. Thus, in terms of the AWACS, the category ‘gathering
data’ can be broken down into storing and processing data and exchanging information.
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Cognitive systems engineering principles highlight the importance of
understanding the value, action, and information constraints of a control problem (i.e.,
work domain). Indeed, the abstraction hierarchy provides an excellent example of how to
uncover the variety of a work domain so that appropriate control solutions can be
anticipated to maintain stability. It should be clear that representing domain constraints is
a necessary precondition for perceiving specific connections between values, actions, and
information. However, although the abstraction hierarchy represents the control problem,
it does not specify how agents develop control solutions to stabilize the system. In other
words, the abstraction hierarchy reveals potential control problems but does not indicate
specific control solutions – only possibilities for developing solutions. The next chapter
discusses how agents develop control solutions through sensemaking. With an
understanding of how, we can guide the design, support, and protection of safety-critical,
complex socio-technical systems.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM NOVICE TO EXPERT: THE EVOLUTION OF A HRO

Control problems that are characterized by unanticipated variability require
flexible and adaptive control solutions (i.e., control solutions with sufficient variety).
Organizations are successful at maintaining stability to the extent that they can eliminate
a recognized discrepancy between what the organization wants to happen and what is
happening. The role of developing an abstraction hierarchy is to uncover control demands
in order to inform the development of ‘transparent’ representations (i.e., revealing work
domain constraints) that allows agents to develop possible control solutions. However,
an outline of the field of possibilities does not specify how control solutions develop and
evolve. An understanding of how an organization learns behaviorally over time and from
experience is needed to elucidate the control solution aspect. Specifically, understanding
how an organization learns provides valuable insights into how it develops and employs
specific control solutions to dynamic and complex control problems.
Continuous Organizational Learning
Organizational learning (i.e., developing control solutions) is important because it
is the process whereby organizations adapt to complex and ever changing situations. If
situations are relatively static and predictable, standards and plans can be effectively
utilized in order to maintain system stability. However, when situations change and the
future trajectory of system behavior is uncertain, agents must be capable of changing
their behavior and beliefs about the work domain.
Organizational learning occurs when a system reflects on its experience and
action, draws conclusions, and uses conclusions to guide behavior (Dewey, 1896; Mead,
1910; Weick, 1995). Learning is purposeful, in that it is directed at solving a meaningful
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control problem, i.e., something that obstructs progress toward an integral goal. Learning
involves restructuring performance and acquiring new methods and skills (i.e., effortful
adaptation; Ericson & Charness, 1994). Indeed, expert performance (i.e., consistently
superior performance) is contingent upon effortful adaptation wherein agents adjust to the
demands of emerging situations (Ericson & Charness, 1994). To the extent that problems
or surprises consistently emerge through complex HROs, learning is continuous (i.e.,
control solutions are continuously being refined and adapted).
Continuous learning is a requirement for organizations that “operate under very
trying conditions all the time and yet manage to have fewer than their fair share of
accidents” (HROs; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Thus, HROs must anticipate large
problems from small disturbances and be capable of flexibly adapting to surprising
situations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The following sections explore the process of
organizational learning as developing, employing, and evaluating specific theories of
action (i.e., control solutions) for dynamic and complex control problems.
Theories of Action
Strategies developed to address particular work demands are based on beliefs,
derived from experience, about a system’s constraints (Dewey, 1938; Rasmussen, 1994).
As discussed in the previous chapter, understanding system constraints is a necessary
precondition for perceiving specific connections between values, actions, and
information. Through this understanding and experience with a work domain,
alternatives and patterns for self-control emerge, resulting in specific control strategies.
Knowledge of a specific connection between an action and a consequence is
defined as a belief, control solution, or theory of action (Argyris & Schon, 1985; see p.
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34). Indeed, “from the perspective of the agent who holds the theory [of action], it is a
theory of control” (Argyris & Schon, 1985; p. 81). Maintaining control of a complex and
dynamic situation can be seen as experimenting, undergoing, establishing and referring to
beliefs about the objects of experience and their consequences. The maintenance of
theories of action and their influence on action persists unabated so long as stability is
maintained. In other words, a validated control solution remains static until violated (i.e.,
proves inadequate).
Argyris and Schon’s (1985) theories of action provide a theoretical framework for
understanding the development and modification of control solutions. Theories of action
conceptualizes human agents as ‘designers of action’ that direct behavior to achieve
intended consequences and monitor consequences to determine if they are meaningful
(e.g., effective). According to the authors, agents “…make sense of their environment by
constructing meaning to which they attend, and these constructions in turn guide action.
In monitoring the effectiveness of action, they also monitor the suitability of their
construction of the environment” (Argyris & Schon, 1985; p. 81). Thus, in Argyris and
Schon’s (1985) terms, agents must develop simplified representations of the control
problem and a small set of potential theories of action (i.e., hypotheses or control
solutions based on control problem constraints) to maintain system stability.
When faced with an unanticipated situation, agents can change their prior beliefs
about a situation by generating a small set of theories of action that might explain the
surprise determine methods for system stabilization (Argyris & Schon, 1985; Klein,
1993; Peirce, 1908; Weick, 2005). The process of formulating an apparently valid theory
of action in light of unanticipated variability and testing the viability of that theory of
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action through current conditions is called abduction (Peirce, 1908). The selection of a
theory of action (i.e., hypothesis) and subsequent testing of that theory of action is
described by Peirce (1908), who stated that there are two criteria for the generation and
selection of hypotheses: 1) a hypothesis should be explanatory in that it should be
generated with the intent to explain a surprising phenomenon, 2) a hypothesis should be
verifiable - it should be testable by deducing possible predictions, and testing these
predictions by means of induction. For instance, in the domain of combat air operations
an AWACS WD discovers an unknown track on her situation display (see Chapter 2).
The AWACS WD hypothesizes that the track is either an enemy aircraft, a friendly
aircraft that was (inadvertently) not scheduled to be in the area, or an error in the radar
sensor (e.g., noise). Each of the above hypotheses can explain the unknown track and
can be verified by a variety of procedures. For example, the AWACS WD can consult
the ATO to determine if it was previously scheduled; she can consult with the AOC to
establish if any last minute friendly missions were scheduled; she can order a friendly
fighter to engage in a fly-by to visually assess the nature of the unknown track.
Sensemaking
Abduction is the general foundation for the process of sensemaking, which has a
strong literature base with research that focuses on organizations that exhibit a variety of
levels of complexity (Leedom, 2001; Weick, 1979; 1995; 2005). Sensemaking is an
ongoing process of creating plausible meaning in the flow of experience. Specifically,
sensemaking involves retrospectively interpreting situations (sense) and prospectively
enacting a potentially new configuration of the environment (making; Weick, 1995).
Sensemaking explicitly occurs when the current state of the world is perceived to be
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different from the expected state of the world, namely when belief is broken (i.e., a
surprise). New experiences are typically framed against expectations based on old
experiences - otherwise, surprise has no meaning. The process of sensemaking is best
described in terms of Piaget’s concepts of assimilation and accommodation (Piaget,
1928). Assimilation imposes organization on new experience by incorporating it into the
framework of previous experience. In other words, if a particular theory of action
effectively stabilizes a system in light of a specific control demand, that theory of action
will be utilized in similar future situations. However, when an existing experiential
framework fails to effectively cope with unanticipated variability, the framework must be
changed. Put differently, if a theory of action fails to stabilize a situation, it should be
changed. Failure to change a theory of action (i.e., experiential framework) can lead to
confirmation bias.
Confirmation bias. Learning and the development of successful theories of action
are inhibited when agents discount new information that contradicts prior beliefs. Goh
and Wiegmann (2001) provide an example of the effects of confirmation bias when they
found that although severe changes in weather were directly relevant to safely flying an
aircraft, some pilots did not consistently detect weather changes because they maintained
the belief that their flight plan was safe. Ultimately, the pilots sought information that
confirmed their belief that their flight plan was safe and discounted information to the
contrary. Similarly, O’Brien and Ellsworth (1996) found that if a police officer believed
that a person was likely to be a suspect (i.e., they match a description, are located in a
high crime area, act strangely) the officer was likely to form a belief that the person was
potentially dangerous. With this belief in mind, the officer tended to look for evidence to
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support their belief and ignore, avoid, or rationalize evidence that contradicted it. When
the person appeared with an object in hand, it was interpreted as a gun (O’Brien &
Ellsworth, 1996). This conclusion confirmed the initial belief that the suspect was
dangerous. It should be clear from the above examples that unquestionable adherence to
beliefs can lead to negative outcomes when coping with surprise. Learning in terms of
successful and flexible theories of action result when underlying values and assumptions
that distort understanding are questioned (Argyris & Schon, 1996).
Making sense. When a specific strategy does not successfully stabilize a system
in light of uncertainty, innovative theories of action must be developed and deployed.
This accommodation, or sense making reflects an adaptive change toward improved
fitness (Piaget, 1928; Weick, 2005). Put another way, sensemaking represents the
process of developing a better match between old theories of action and new experiences.
For example, a homeowner notices a leak under the sink (i.e., control problem) that she
believes is due to a loose pipe fitting that she prefers to tighten on her own (i.e., control
solution). In this example, there are two aspects of the control solution or theory-in-use
that are important to note: First, the homeowner prefers to fix the leak herself. Argyris
and Schon (1985) define values and preferences that agents seek to satisfy as governing
variables, which represent specific value constraints that guide beliefs and action.
Second, Argyris and Schon define the homeowner’s actions in terms of tightening the
fitting as an action strategy. In other words, action strategies represent the specific
control strategies afforded by constraints on action.
To continue with the above example, the homeowner manually tightens the loose
pipe fitting, which stops the leak, thereby confirming her action strategy (feedback about
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the status of the leak represents constraints on information). Several months later, the
homeowner again notices a leak under the sink. She engages in the pattern of action that
relates to her previously confirmed theory of action and attempts to manually tighten the
loose pipe fitting. However, tightening the loose pipe fitting (i.e., action strategy) does
not appear to stop the leak. The homeowner decides to forcefully jiggle the pipe, which
stops the leak. Argyris and Schon (1985) define utilizing a new action strategy (i.e.,
forcefully jiggling the pipe) in the service of the same governing variable (attempting to
fix the pipe herself), single-loop learning. In other words, the homeowner assimilates the
new action strategy into her existing experiential framework.
Alternatively, if forcefully jiggling the pipe does not stop the leak and cracks the
pipe and causes a mild flood in the kitchen, the homeowner possibly will question her
role in fixing the pipe and may decide to call the plumber. Argyris and Schon (1985)
define this type of learning, whereby governing variables or values are questioned or
modified and new action strategies developed, double-loop learning. Double-loop
learning represents sensemaking, or the accommodation of a new experiential
configuration of the environment. In other words, “single-loop learning is like a
thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off. The
thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the temperature of
the room) and take corrective action. Double-loop learning occurs when error is detected
and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying
norms, policies and objectives” (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 2-3).
During standard operations, strategies to cope with minor disturbances are
assimilated into a pre-established belief system or framework through single-loop
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learning. In organizations wherein coordination is achieved through standardization or
by plan, single-loop learning is sufficient – indeed, desired in order to maintain system
stability. To be sure, system designers (or organizational executives) do not want agents
to change the governing variables that support stable system functioning. For example,
in a process control plant (e.g., nuclear power, chemical synthesis plant; systems with
tight coupling and high dimensionality), operators are tasked with ensuring that specific
physical processes are within some acceptable range (i.e., governing variables).
Depending on action and information constraints, operators can utilize a variety of action
strategies to keep process values within the range delimited by governing variables.
However, altering governing variables can compromise the systems integrity. In other
words, in process control, the governing variables are set by the constraints of the
physical system (e.g., nuclear physics) and it is the operator’s role to employee control
solutions to ensure that physical performance stays within safe limits.
In systems characterized by uncertainty and unanticipated variability, wherein
stability is maintained through mutual adjustment, both single-loop and double-loop
learning are effective ways of making decisions about the design and implementation of
action. To refer back to the earlier AWACS example (a system with loose coupling and
high dimensionality), single-loop learning leads to incremental changes in the way WDs
cope with anticipated situations. Thus, many AWACS situations require WDs to focus
on tactics or specific action strategies implemented to stabilize expected or standard
situations. When WDs detect an unknown track, they can rely on their ATO to determine
if the track is a scheduled friendly aircraft. According to Air Force Doctrine, the ATO
represents the detailed schedule of every event within an area of responsibility during a
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specified period of time. If an unknown track does not show up on the ATO as a
scheduled event, the WD can suspect that the unknown track could have hostile intent.
Double-checking with the air operations center (the developer of the ATO) can rule out
most potential ATO errors. Additionally, the AWACS IFF system can reveal that the
unknown track does not emit a ‘friendly’ signal. Consequently, based on the governing
values of standard AWACS operations, the unknown track can be identified as hostile.
However, what if the AWACS operator questions the suitability of the governing values
in determining the status of the unknown track? What if the unknown track is NOT
hostile? What if the aircraft’s IFF signal and radio is not working properly? What if
someone forgot to schedule some activity within the area of operations? What if the
unknown track is a civilian aircraft that is flying outside of its original flight plan? Under
these circumstances, WDs might examine the original way that they interpreted the
unknown track and evaluate the values, beliefs, and assumptions that are leading them to
frame the unknown track as hostile. Perhaps, the governing variables are insufficient for
coping with this unanticipated situation. Thus, the AWACS WDs deviate from standard
action strategies, avoid confirmation bias, and call in a fighter aircraft to conduct a fly-by
to visually determine the intent of the unknown track.
Summary. All systems require agents, at the individual-, team-, and platformlevel, to assimilate effective theories of action based on prior experience. However,
systems characterized by surprise require agents to re-frame theories of action in order to
accommodate unanticipated situations. In other words, in order to cope with complex
and ambiguous situations, organizations must engage in both single-loop learning and
double-loop learning (i.e., sensemaking). When confronted with a surprising situation,
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agents formulate and select a theory of action that can account for the unanticipated
event. These theories of action are ‘tested’ within action constraints and their utility
determined through constraints on information. If a theory of action stabilizes the system
(i.e., satisfies the control problem), it will become a tentative part of the belief system to
be utilized again in similar situations.
Developing Expertise
Extended experience through a specific work domain, wherein an agent has the
opportunity to maintain stability through the development and employment of a multitude
of control strategies leads to expertise (Ericson & Charness, 1994). Like novices, experts
engage in sensemaking when they encounter unanticipated situations. However, unlike
novices, experts focus on the relevant features of a specific control problem. Therefore,
experts are better able than novices to monitor the suitability of their construction of the
environment, which guides action (Argyris & Schon, 1985). The following sections
explain the development of expertise through extended experience through a specific
work domain.
Through iterative cycles, agents make sense of challenging situations by
integrating theories of action that lead to construction of new knowledge (i.e., beliefs).
By restructuring performance, acquiring new methods and skills through experience with
a work domain, and consistently maintaining stability, organizations achieve expert
performance (Ericson & Charness, 1994). In other words, experts acquire stability by
‘extended adaptation’ to the specific value, action, and information constraints of the
work domain (Ericson & Charness, 1994). With extended experience through a work
domain, agents are able to recognize familiar situations, anticipate potential control
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problems, and coordinate adaptive responses to maintain stability. Indeed, Ericson and
Charness state that “in the perceptual environment…expert performance is continuous
and changing, and experts must be able to recognize if and when a particular action is
required. Most important, it is possible for the expert to analyze the current situation and
thereby anticipate future events” (1994, p. 736). Flach and colleagues (1990) define the
abovementioned process of discovering the significance of situations, attunement.
Flach (1990) argues that expertise is contingent upon the degree of coupling
between an agent(s) and a work domain. Thus, an expert’s interpretation of a particular
situation highly corresponds to the significance of that situation relative to a specific
work domain (Flach, 1990). In other words, experts recognize or attune to meaningful
patterns of information within a work domain that are directly related to domain
functionality (e.g., threats, opportunities; see Figure 3.1). With continued experience
through a specific work domain, experts become attuned to large meaningful patterns of
information in the work domain; perform at a faster pace and in a relatively error-free
way compared with novices; and make sense of control problems (e.g., surprise) in a
more principled way than novices (Glasser & Chi, 1988; cited in Flach, 1990).
AWARENESS
SITUATION

Attuned

Unattuned

Significant

FUNCTIONAL
(Informative)

NONFUNCTIONAL
(Noninformative)

Not significant

DYSFUNCTIONAL
(Misinformative)

AFUNCTIONAL
(Uninformative)

Figure 3.1. Correspondence between situation and awareness (Flach, et al.,
1990).
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Flach and colleagues (1990) describe the development of expertise in the context
of the Figure 3.1:
A [expert] is one who can tune into task relevant structures and who can
tune out task irrelevant structures. The development of [expertise] can be
conceived of as a migration of information within the matrix . . . such that
nonfunctional structures become functional and dysfunctional structures
become afunctional. [Experts attuned to] relevant event structures to
which the novice is unattuned. [Learning involves] extinguishing
attention to irrelevant structure (make dysfunctional structure
afunctional). Attending to irrelevant structure may, at worse, lead to
divergence from the task objectives (errors) and at best constitutes an
inefficient use of limited attentional resources (p. 329).
Referring back to voice loops within the domain of space shuttle mission control
(see Chapter 2) experts are better able to attune to significant patterns within the flow of
active communication than novices. Extensive experience with listening in on voice
loops affords operators the opportunity to discover invariant patterns of communication
that correspond to properties of space shuttle mission control. Therefore, expert operators
quickly attune to situational patterns that are significant with regard to the functional
goals of mission control (Gibson, 1969, cited in Flach, 1990). Specifically, from
communication patterns through voice loops, operators are able to recognize when there
are problems within adjacent subsystems, how a problem might be emerging due another
operator’s behavior, when to interrupt other operators to ask significant questions, and
how deviations in the typical flow of voice loop communication relate to the overall
health of mission control.
To reiterate an important point, expertise is contingent upon the degree of
coupling between agents – at the individual, team, or platform-level - and a work domain.
Thus, a “team’s situation awareness or the team’s understanding of a complex and
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dynamic situation at any one point in time” plays a critical role in team performance
(Cooke, et al., 2003). Expertise, or consistently superior performance is attained by
attuning to significant situational patterns of information that have been discovered
through experience with a dynamic work domain.
Summary
In the above sections, it was argued that maintaining the stability of complex and
dynamic systems, such as AWACS, is predicated on continuous organizational learning.
Indeed, understanding how agents develop theories of action for dynamic and complex
control problems is an important first step in designing, supporting, and protecting
complex socio-technical systems. Learning was explained from the perspective of
theories of action, whereby control solutions are either based on previous experiential
frameworks (i.e., single-loop learning; assimilation) or are based on accommodating new
hypotheses based on new experiential frameworks (i.e., double-loop learning;
sensemaking). The next chapter elaborates on how the continuous organizational
learning processes that occur through complex socio-technical systems, such as the
AWACS, can be scientifically explored. Additionally, the methodology employed for a
specific study is discussed.
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CHAPTER 4: SYNTHETIC TASK ENVIRONMENTS: MANAGING
COMPLEXITY IN THE LABORATORY
To cope with complex control problems, agents must be capable of understanding
constraints on values (i.e., purpose), action (i.e., what agents can do), and information
(feedback that enables controlled action). Specifically, agents jointly construct
understanding of value, action, and information constraints through mutually adjusting to
each other and to dynamic situations. In other words, agents jointly develop theories of
action through the ongoing process of sensemaking. The occurrence and importance of
this process increases in complex systems that are characterized by loose coupling and
high dimensionality, such as HROs, where situational uncertainty and ambiguity are high.
Unfortunately, questions related to how one scientifically studies this process
have not been addressed. In other words, how can a scientist conduct empirical research
on complex domains to better understand how agents learn domain constraints and, in
turn, jointly develop effective control solutions?
It is extraordinarily difficult to conduct empirical research through many complex
domains, such as AWACS battle management. Indeed, due to the hazards of conducing
research through a ‘live’ domain and the multiple levels of organizational performance
inherent to complex domains, scientists tend to reduce and simplify experiential
phenomena in order to allow sufficient experimental control. Although reducing and
simplifying experiential phenomena affords experimental control, it also neglects
dynamic and emergent behavior and multi-level performance characteristics of complex
systems. On the other hand, conducting empirical research through complex natural
work domains is not feasible (e.g,. due to safety, cost). Synthetic task environments (i.e.,
STEs; also known as microworld environments) bridge the gap between naturalistic
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empiricism and experimental reductionism by offering a rich (i.e., meaningful)
representation of a complex work domain and sufficient experimental control.
The following chapter will explore science from the ‘classical’ reductionistic
point of view and explain the limitations of its premises in regard to studying complex
systems. Due to these limitations, this chapter advocates an alternative, ‘science of
complexity’ when attempting to understand behavior through complex systems. STEs
are discussed as a pragmatic tool for reflecting the meaningful aspects and multiple
performance dimensions of the AWACS air battle management domain, uncovered by
cognitive work analyses, within the relative control inherent to a laboratory.
Supplementing ‘Classical’ Science with a Science of Complexity
Contemporary organizational theorists – and, scientists in general, take a limited
view of the world of natural phenomena. In Chapter 1, Perrow’s complexity space was
transformed into a representation of what we consider to be the meaningful dimensions of
complexity (see Figure 2.1). From this new vantage point, it can be seen that HROs fall
outside the purview of NAT (see Figure 4.1). In general, it can be seen that many
complex phenomena fall outside the purview of ‘classical’ science. To be sure, NAT and
many forms of contemporary science take a more ‘classical’ approach to natural
phenomena. Thus, systems with well defined and relatively static natural constraints are
most frequently scientifically explored. This preference for systems that exhibit
characteristically few degrees of freedom and tight coupling is probably due to the ease
and efficiency of using classical scientific techniques, such as controlled laboratory
experiment. However, when systems are open, have many constraints (i.e., high
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dimensionality) and are relatively loosely coupled, ‘classical’ techniques for
understanding natural phenomena can be too simplistic to account for complex behavior.

Figure 4.1. Traditional science versus a science of complexity.
‘Classical’ Science vs. Science of Complexity
The classic paradigm for studying the complexities of organization is based on
Newton's methods of understanding the universe. Newton's universe was a linear, closed
set of events governed by cause and effect and the conservation of matter and energy.
Matter was considered to be composed of a finite number of indivisible particles. Energy
was thought to be a characteristic of matter. The goal of physicists was to gather enough
facts so that they could predict any event with absolute certainty. Edward Lorenz found
that in fluid systems like the atmosphere (i.e., systems with variables that are completely
interconnected), even tiny changes in the modeling of such systems produces what is
known as a 'butterfly effect' – that is, a divergence in behavior that is disproportional to
the size of the initial difference. Thus Lorenz (1963) found that there was 'sensitivity to
initial conditions'.
Coming to the same conclusion as Lorenz, some scientists have reasoned that the
nervous system dynamically interacts with enough inputs of complexity to be considered
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a chaotic, unpredictable system (Mandlebrot, 1982). What these scientists argue is that
cause and effect are part of a dynamic interplay that results in phenomenon that science
may not be able to dissect with a reductionist methodology. The idealization of isolation
(i.e., reduction) ignores the interaction between object and environment, the interaction
between particle and space. To be sure, ‘classical’ science attempts to force opensystems into a closed-system space. However, considering nature as a closed system
constrains the phenomenon: there are no closed systems in nature. Thus, any description
of organization in terms of causes that are isolated from the system will be incomplete
(see Kurt Godel's theorem of incompleteness, 1979).
Circular causation. It is difficult to discern cause from effect in systems with
loose coupling and high dimensionality. Indeed, in such systems there is a circular
dynamic between cause and effect. Thus, for example, a behavioral motor response
determines stimulus just as truly as a sensory stimulus determines movement (e.g.,
Dewey, 1896); action creates interesting goals at the same time goals justify action (e.g.,
March, 1971; Weick, 1995); agents affect technology and culture just as technology and
culture affects agents (e.g., Hutchins, 1995). Attempting to reduce whole situations into
isolated elements is a dangerous affair; making causal attributions about those isolated
elements is even more dangerous. To be sure, through complex biological organization,
Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) make clear that an apparent cause is usually a result of
some former cause, and effects tend to affect cause; a multiplicity of interaction and
emergence typically qualifies post hoc discovery of a phenomenon. Certainly, in order
for sense to be made of organization, phenomena of interest must be explored in context.
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Context matters. John Dewey (1938; p. 72) states that "What is designated by the
word 'situation' is not a single object or event or set of objects and events. For we never
experience nor form judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in
connection with a contextual whole [i.e., a situation]." Indeed, scientists have
continuously focused attention on abstract pieces or static moments of complex
processes. Dewey reminds us of the fallacy of taking a singular object or event for the
subject-matter of analysis, for "in actual experience, there is never any such isolated
singular object or event; an object or event is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an
environing experienced world- a situation" (1938; p. 67). Thus, observation of an object
or event occurs in an experiential 'field' that defines and constrains the object or event.
Any qualification of the object or event must be made within the contextual frame of
reference. Hence, understanding complex systems requires determining the dynamic,
meaningful constraints on action (Hutchins, 1995; see also Cybernetic theory; Weiner,
1948; 1967).
Bridging the Gap: Synthetic Task Environments
Scientific research exploring complex systems through reductionism neglects
meaningful dimensions of complex systems, whereas empirically exploring a complex
natural domain is not feasible. Synthetic environments based on in-depth analyses of a
complex domain provide a meaningful method of bridging the gap between these
disconnected paradigms (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2. Bridging the gap between the naturalistic domain and
traditional laboratory research.
Synthetic environments. Synthetic environments provide a medium-fidelity
environment through which an experimenter can represent the essential relations and
characteristics of a domain (i.e., the complexity, dynamics, and transparency) while
maintaining a moderate level of experimental control (see Brehmer & Dorner, 1993, for a
discussion on Synthetic Task Environments and their use). As mentioned above,
complexity is reflected in the degree of coupling and dimensionality of a work domain.
Loosely coupled, high dimensional systems exhibit greater complexity than tightly
coupled, low dimensional systems. Synthetic environments allow a scientist to model the
loosely (or, tightly) coupled components according to varying degrees of dimensionality.
The dynamics (i.e., continuous change within a system) of a situation are revealed when
an action effects all subsequent actions – as in the ‘butterfly effect’ seen by Lorenz in his
seminal work on complexity in weather systems. Thus dynamics are present when a
system has ‘memory’ and can ‘remember’ what has happened through it. Synthetic task
environment dynamics are a function of both the state of the synthetic environment (as
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modified by earlier actions) and the current action. Because the environment is dynamic,
agents must respond to changing situations.
The relative transparency or opaqueness of a system is the degree agents can ‘see’
or understand the various and changing constraints of a domain. For example,
firefighting involves developing strategies based on an understanding of various
constraints on value (e.g., extinguishing fires and saving lives), action (e.g., breaking
through walls, dowsing with water), and information (e.g., radio transmitters, infra-red
goggles) unique to firefighting that must be understood in order for agents to control the
system. However, removed from the danger inherent in firefighting environments, these
same constraints can be represented in a STE, allowing for an empirical examination of
transparency. As agents transact with synthetic environmental situations, they can
discover and jointly construct control solutions for complex fire-extinguishing problems
such as backdraft. Thus, the underlying processes can be examined in a manageable and
safe environment.
In order to develop a synthetic representation of a complex environment one must
understand the system’s constraints. One strategy for modeling and understanding the
functional constraints of a complex work domain is conducting a work domain analysis
(see Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994; Vicente, 1999). Work domain analysis
uncovers the goals and constraints, the potential relationships among goals, functions and
processes, the criteria available for allocation of roles to individual agents, and the
coordination needed….” (Rasmussen, 1991).
Cognitive Work Analysis. To gain insight into the dimensionality of a work
domain, it is necessary to explore and analyze the field of work (i.e., constraints on value,
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action, and information) in a natural setting (i.e., where the phenomena of interest occur).
Thus, cognitive work analysis (i.e., CWA) represents an approach to understanding work
domains by evaluating existing system behavior in context (see Chapter 2). Cognitive
work analyses focus on the functional purpose(s) of a system or work domain, the general
and specific rules and principles that guide purposeful system behavior, and the physical
functions and properties that help realize overall systemic functionality (Rasmussen et.
al., 1986).
Cognitive work analyses have been used in a variety of systems to gain a better
understanding of the field of work (e.g., library search - Pejtersen, 1989; nuclear power
plant safety - Rasmussen, et al., 1994; process control -Vicente, 1999). Specifically, and
of relevance to this work, several CWAs have been performed in the AWACS domain
(Fahey, Rowe, Dunlop, & deBoom, 2001; Hess, MacMillan, Serfaty, & Elliot, 1999;
Klinger, Andriole, Militello, Adelman, & Klein, 1994; Means & Burns, 2005; Schiflett,
Elliot, & Cardenas, 2000). These work analyses elaborate, at a fine level of detail,
AWACS BMC2 fields of work – hence, helping to answer questions pertaining to what to
study and what metrics matter. Further, from these work analyses, it is possible to
reconstruct or represent the fundamental functional, ideological, and physical dimensions
of the AWACS battle management work domain – thus, helping to answer questions
pertaining to who and what we study and what types of scientific tools we employ.
From a scientific perspective, the processes associated with discovering and
developing solutions to stabilize complex problems are as important as the emergent
situational outcomes that result. Processes represent the strategies and behavioral
patterns that are continuously adapting to changing demands. Thus, processes are
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capturing organizational dynamics across events and situations. On the other hand,
outcomes represent a ‘snapshot’ of what was achieved in regard to specific organizational
values. Ultimately, performance through complex domains is characterized by both
process and outcome-related dimensions.
Processes vs. outcomes. Systems can be viewed from a process or outcome
orientation. Processes represent the ‘operators’, ‘actions’, or ‘means’ that cause a
sequence of changes in the properties of a system. Processes are the means for
transforming or moving from one system state to another. Outcomes represent the ‘state’
dimensions (i.e., the changes or consequences resulting from a process, operation, or
action). Therefore, a trajectory through a state space reflects an outcome wherein the
actions that ‘drive’ the motion through the state space are the processes. Thus measures
of performance can be categorized as indexing either processes or outcomes. Process
measures reflect the sensemaking and communication processes that bring together the
experience, skills, resources, and technology of various agents to execute a mission or
plan. Outcome measures address the actual results achieved and the impact of a team
completing (or not completing) a specific mission. Both process and outcome measures
can be collected through synthetic environments. Communication and sensemaking
processes can be examined over time and specific outcome measures can be tabulated
from performance relative to mission requirements and goals.
Synthetic environments allow an experimenter to measure both process and
outcome from multiple levels of abstraction. Additionally, performance relationships
between levels of abstraction can be explored empirically. Higher levels of abstraction
represent the more holistic or emergent properties of a system. Alternatively, lower
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levels of abstraction represent the particulate or component elements that interact/transact
to form the emergent, holistic properties of a system. For example, in thermodynamics,
phases are emergent phenomena produced by the self-organization of a large number of
particles. Phase transitions are the sudden physical transformation of one phase to
another (e.g., liquid to gaseous phase) due to a change in temperature. Thus as
temperature changes past a critical point in a thermodynamic system, there are qualitative
changes in the patterns among particulates. This relates directly to performance in
complex domains: the emergent behavior of the organization (i.e., mission success) is
analogous to temperature and the micro-behavior of agents represents particulates. As
mission success changes (e.g., increases) one might expect to see qualitative changes in
patterns among the particulates (e.g., strategy patterns) or vice versa, changes in patterns
of behavior at the micro-level may lead to enhanced mission success.
Air Battle Management
Air Battle Management is a complex domain that can be represented in a STE,
affording the examination of the research question: what is the relationship between
phase changes in strategy and the level of mission success. Air Battle Management
entails effecting command and control (C2) of assigned forces by planning, organizing,
and directing operations. Air Battle Managers, also known as Weapons Directors (WDs),
provide friendly forces with a ‘big picture’ of the battle-space; assisting in finding,
identifying, and destroying enemy targets, keeping track of friendly assets, and
coordinating air refueling.
Air Battle Management functions are accomplished at the operational level (i.e.,
the planning, conducting, and sustaining of large units to obtain strategic goals within a
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theater) through Air Operations Centers (AOC). The AOC is the centralized operational
facility that plans, directs, and controls deployed air assets (Air Operations Center
Standard Operating Procedure; Twelfth Air Force Air Force Forces).

The Combat Plans

Division is the AOC element responsible for building the air campaign plan and the daily
Air Tasking Order (ATO), which is the published order that directs all air missions (Air
Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures).
Air Battle Management functions are accomplished at the tactical level (i.e.,
combat operations taken to achieve specific objectives) through the USAF E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
(STARS), the USN E2C Hawkeye (see Armistead [2002] and Williams [1997] for more
information on airborne platforms), and a variety of ground-based Control and Reporting
Centers (CRC). At the tactical level, functionality is contingent upon sensor capabilities:
AWACS and JSTARS’ radar and computer subsystems can gather and present expansive
and detailed battle-space information for air-to-air and air-to-surface battle management;
USN E2C Hawkeye is a carrier-based system with similar air-to-surface and air-to-air
sensor capability for maritime tactical scenarios; and CRCs are land based, short-range
systems responsible for tactical air control within their area of responsibility (AOR).
Despite the variety of battle management platforms, Weapons Directors (WDs;
i.e., Air Battle Managers) perform analogous tasks, under similar conditions, with
comparable displays and controls (Knott et al., 2007). Thus WDs are required to monitor
a multiplicity of simultaneous communications channels under conditions of moderate to
high ambient cabin noise while performing several visual and manual tasks (Bolia et al.,
2005). Additionally, said tasks are performed as part of an integrated team. The latter
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requirement is significant because it emphasizes the importance of collaboration and
coordination for the achievement of tactical and operational goals (see Chapter 3; Knott
et al., 2007).
Weapons Directors working through the AWACS battle management domain
must cope with agent and environmental interdependencies in order to successfully
stabilize the battlespace situation. The following section describes the AWACS battle
management domain (based on results of cognitive work analyses; Fahey, Rowe, Dunlop,
& deBoom, 2001; Hess, MacMillan, Serfaty, & Elliot, 1999; Klinger, Andriole, Militello,
Adelman, & Klein, 1994; Means & Burns, 2005; Schiflett, Elliot, & Cardenas, 2000) and
how, by utilizing synthetic task environments, scientists can explore how agents jointly
learn domain constraints and develop successful control solutions relative to complex
control problems.
AWACS Battle Management
The [Weapons Director] position can be likened to that of an Air
Traffic Controller in the sky, with some important differences:
commercial aircraft seldom shoot at one another, the Air Traffic
Controller never needs to monitor an airborne track in order to
determine intent; Air Traffic Controllers are seldom in danger of
being shot down (they are not flying in the sky with the aircraft
they are controlling); and they do not need to worry about rules
of engagement. (Klinger, Andriole, Militello, Adelman, &
Klein, 1994, p. 3)

The AWACS provides unprecedented aerial surveillance and battle management
capabilities for the United States Air Force. Specifically, the AWACS can detect and
track hostile aircraft over all terrain, identify static and mobile ground targets, and can
control friendly aircraft in the same airspace during complex, dynamic, and timesensitive situations (Boeing Corporation, 2007). The ‘heart and soul’ of the AWACS is a
four to six member Weapons Director (WD) team. As Klinger and colleagues (1994)
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illustrate in the above quote, the AWACS WD can be equated to a military, airborne, airtraffic-controller that must work through an active battle-space according to a prescribed
Air Tasking Order.
The AWACS WD team typically consists of three or more WDs that direct
friendly assets, and one Senior Director (SD) that essentially performs as a WD team
leader; often, the SD is the ranking officer. The WDs workload is divided either
geographically or functionally. Thus each WD is assigned either a geographical region
within the AWACSs’ area of responsibility (AOR) or, more customarily, each WD is
assigned a primary role or responsibility within the AOR. The standard functional
division of labor among the WDs consists of a Tanker WD (i.e., primarily responsible for
airborne tankers and coordinating re-fueling), a AOR WD (i.e, primarily responsible for
the assigned airspace: coordinating fighters, identifying enemy targets, protecting
friendly assets), and a Check-in WD (i.e., primarily responsible for ‘checking’ assets into
the AOR and ‘passing’ them over to the AOR WD). Although, primary roles are
assigned to each WD, all WDs receive the same training and are responsible for
performing all roles depending on the situation. Thus AWACS WD functional roles are
transferable; a feature that benefits the WD team during complex, dynamic, and timesensitive situations (Schifflett, Elliot, & Cardenas, 2000).
The AWACS WD team assumes a command and control role for U.S. military
forces. In other words, the WD team is responsible for accomplishing a variety of
functions (i.e., allocating sensors, fighters, bombers, tankers, and assigning weapons and
systems) in order to achieve desired operational effects (Means & Burns, 2005).
AWACS teams fulfill this command and control role by interdependently tracking and
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coordinating tactical action in accordance with overall strategic goals and procedures
over an extended period of time (Schiflett, Elliot, & Cardenas, 2000). Thus teamwork, or
effectively managing interdependencies, is a fundamental function enacted by AWACS
WD teams.
A team is defined as “…a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact
dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued
goal/object/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform,
and have a limited life span of membership” (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, &
Tannenbaum, 1992; p. 4). Teamwork, or the adaptive management of dynamic
interdependencies, depends on the degree to which team members must jointly manage
value, action, and information constraints through unanticipated situations (i.e.,
environmental variability) and the extent to which agents within the team must manage
agent interdependencies (Thompson, 1967).
An important aspect of a team, as defined above, is the notion of a set of
dynamically interdependent agents acting adaptively toward a shared goal or objective.
In addition to team action reflecting open-system characteristics in terms of coping with
unanticipated environmental variability, team actions are expected to reflect closedsystem characteristics in terms of goal directed behavior – to be rational and sensible.
Rationality in an open-system is continuously challenged by ‘external’ and ‘internal’
uncertainties (i.e., distinctions within an ontologically holistic ecology). In other words,
in open-systems, such as AWACS BMC2, there is an expectation of a certain degree of
rationality, in terms of goals and decision-making that is continuously challenged by
‘internal’ and ‘external’ uncertainties. ‘External’ uncertainty is instantiated by a lack of
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value, action, and information constraint understanding based on an environments
interrelationship with team action, whereas ‘internal’ uncertainty is instantiated by the
interdependence of agents within the team.
To reiterate what was stated above, studying teams that work through complex,
open-system domains such as AWACS BMC2 precludes the use of closed-system
methods (e.g., controlled laboratory experiment) that preclude any sort of uncertainty or
contingency. However, often it is not feasible to study AWACS BMC2 teams in situ.
Synthetic task environments bridge the methodological gap, enabling scientists to trade
off some degree of realism for experimental control without forcing phenomena into a
completely closed-system. Thus, the present research examined AWACS BMC2 teams
in action by developing a STE with domain relevant performance metrics based on the
AWACS domain’s functional constraints (i.e., value, action, and information constraints),
as delineated by several cognitive work analyses (Fahey, Rowe, Dunlop, & deBoom,
2001; Hess, MacMillan, Serfaty, & Elliot, 1999; Klinger, Andriole, Militello, Adelman,
& Klein, 1994; Means & Burns, 2005; Schiflett, Elliot, & Cardenas, 2000).
AWACS STE: METHOD
Experimental Task
The Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD; see Appendix A for screenshot
of DDD) system developed by Aptima (http://dddweb.aptima.com) was used to develop
STE scenarios based on the above mentioned analyses of the AWACS WD work domain.
Once developed, the scenarios were reviewed for task, role, and mission realism by a
subject matter expert (a former AWACS WD and SD).
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Scenarios. Air battle management scenarios were developed for this experiment
and are designed to require a team of three Weapons Directors (WDs), a Sensor Operator
(SO), and a Senior Director (SD) to coordinate to sustain a pre-emptive strike. Weapons
Directors coordinate operations (i.e., intercept threats and re-supply assets as needed)
through communication, sharing of fighter and bomber assets, and allocating tanker
assets and sensor information from unmanned areal vehicles (UAV). The scenarios were
presented to WDs via the DDD tactical display (see Figure 4.3), which represented the
area of operations with friendly assets and enemy targets shown as unique symbols. The
tactical display afforded a real-time representation of the battle space from which WDs
were able to monitor and direct simulated air operations.

Figure 4.3. DDD tactical display representing a pre-emptive strike
scenario within the AWACS area of responsibility (AOR).
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The tactical display represents a specific area of responsibility (AOR) that
contains all friendly and enemy assets/targets. The symbols represent assets that are
labeled according to their platform type (e.g., F-18) and call-sign (e.g., BMB-2). There
are three tanker aircraft for unlimited aerial refueling and re-arming of designated fighter
and bomber assets; twelve fighter aircraft equipped with four air-air missiles, one airground bomb, and a random quantity of fuel; twelve bombers equipped with four airground bombs and a random quantity of fuel; and eight UAVs equipped with unlimited
fuel.
Each 15 minute mission scenario is based explicitly on an air tasking order
(ATO): all mission requirements and target priorities are delineated in the ATO (see
Appendix B for example of ATO). Mission scenarios begin with an ATO and an
intelligence briefing (see Appendix C) that graphically indicates possible locations of
enemy targets. Mission scenarios contain several (occasionally mobile) enemy ground
targets and mobile enemy air forces that follow random trajectories within an AOR that
remains the same for all scenarios. Enemy forces have the ability to attack and destroy
all friendly assets (i.e., fighters, bombers, tankers, and UAVs). Each mission scenario
concludes with a de-briefing that includes individually administered surveys and jointly
administered surveys, mediated by the SD (see Appendix D).
The experiment took place in a 9.75 m X 6.5 m room with three Weapons
Directors (WDs) on one side of the room, a Sensor Operator (SO) on the other side,
facing the opposite direction, and a Senior Director (SD) in the middle of the room. Each
operator had a 17-inch flat-panel display that presented the tactical display, the DRAW
whiteboard tool for visual communication, and Microsoft Instant Messenger for text
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messaging. ModIOS® Voice Communicator was used for simulated network radio
communication. Voice and chat-based communications provided linguistic information
whereas the whiteboard technology provided visual/pictorial information. The virtual
whiteboard transparently overlaid the tactical display and provided operators with a
‘shared whiteboard’ whereby each member draws or writes in a shared space. The edited
‘snapshots’ of operators’ visual interface were virtually shared in real-time with other
team members. Operators were allowed to choose their method of communication (i.e.,
radio, chat, whiteboard).
Team composition and responsibilities. Each team is composed of three WDs,
one SD, and one SO. The WD roles are divided into a set of primary, albeit transferable,
responsibilities. The Check-in WD is primarily responsible for launching all aircraft from
an airbase outside of the AOR and transferring those ‘checked-in’ friendly aircraft to the
Area of Responsibility WD (AOR WD) and the SO. The AOR WD is primarily
responsible for what goes on in the AOR: enemy targeting, fighter assets, and bomber
assets. The third WD, the Tanker WD, is primarily responsible for coordinating refueling and restocking all friendly assets and is also responsible for protecting high value
assets (i.e., Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; UAVs). Each of the WDs’ responsibilities are
transferable. For example, the AOR WD can transfer a bomber to the Tanker WD, who
can then be responsible for bombing a ground target. The WDs and the SO communicate
over one communication channel.
The SO is positioned separately from the WDs, but uses the WDs communication
channel. The SO is responsible for controlling UAVs in order to detect the coordinates of
enemy ground targets (that WDs can not detect) within the AOR. Additionally, the SO
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coordinates with WDs to extinguish all ground targets: a primary rule of engagement is
that both SO and WD must maintain visual contact with an enemy target in order to attack
it.
The SD is the officer in charge of the AWACS team. It is the SDs responsibility
to coordinate mission de-briefings after each scenario was completed. Also, the SD
provides supervisory support to WDs during specific control conditions.
The tactical displays for all operators provide a global picture of the battle space
and friendly assets. However, WDs are able to see enemy aircraft and ground targets
only when they come within the limited range of their platform’s sensors. Specifically,
WDs can see air targets when they come within the sensor rings of their asset and can
only see ground targets when they are nearly on top of them. Additionally, WDs cannot
see what other operators see. The SD, on the other hand, sees what all WDs see. The SO
can see ground targets within the sensor rings of the UAV, however, cannot see any
enemy aircraft. Thus, both the WDs and SO have limited awareness of the tactical
picture and must rely on each other to accomplish mission objectives. In particular, WDs
must provide SOs with information concerning mobile enemy aircraft around UAVs and
the SOs must provide WDs with information concerning the location of ground targets
throughout the AOR.
Participants. Two teams of five participated in the experiment, with the same
confederate participating on both teams, resulting in a total of nine individuals (M age =
28; 6 male). Tables 6 and 7 represent the biographical composition of Teams 1 and 3. In
addition to the noted characteristics, members on both teams were personally acquainted
with each other (i.e., members of the same graduate school cohort).
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Table 4.1
Team 1 Subject Biographical Data
Position

Education

Tanker WD

Graduate
School
Undergraduate

AOR WD
Checkin
WD
SO

Graduate
School
Graduate
School
Graduate
School

SD

Gender

Age

Military
Experience

Male

28

5 years

Hours
Gaming Per
Week
1-10

Gaming
Enjoyment

Male

20

1 year

1-10

7

Female

39

12 years

1-10

4

Male

23

0 years

1-10

6

Female

29

0 years

0

3

4

Table 4.2
Team 2 Subject Biographical Data
Position

Education

Tanker WD

High School

Male

22

AOR WD

Undergraduate

Male

Checkin WD

Graduate
School
Graduate
School
Graduate
School

SO
SD

Gender

Age

Military
Experience
4 years

Hours
Gaming Per
Week
1-10

Gaming
Enjoyment
7

27

0 years

1-10

6

Female

42

0 years

0

3

Male

26

0 years

1-10

5

Female

29

0

0

3

Procedure
Prior to the experiment, all participants completed a two day training program that
consisted of a two hour PowerPoint training module and six hours experience engaging in
STE mission scenarios (approximately 6 hours) that were unrelated to experimental
mission scenarios. Participants were trained on the STE, the radio software, DRAW
whiteboard tool, and chat. Participants were also trained on the specific objectives and
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rules of the mission and were instructed that the performance of the team would be
measured for each trial based on how well they met their objectives and followed the
rules. The trainer informed participants that the purpose of the study was to evaluate how
teams work together and that they would be playing a computer game that required
teamwork to meet the game’s objectives. Training concluded with a quiz that all subjects
were required to pass with complete accuracy (i.e., 100 percent correct). Upon successful
completion of training, subjects selected their team role (i.e., AOR WD; Checkin WD;
Tanker WD; SO), which they were to maintain across all STE mission scenarios.
Upon completing training, participants returned over the course of three months
for experimental sessions. Each experimental session consisted of approximately eight
trials. As mentioned above, after each trial, participants completed several subjective
instruments designed to assess individual and team beliefs. Participants were given one
10-minute rest period after they had completed four trials. All major simulation events
(e.g., the occurrence and outcome of attacks, refuelling events, etc.) were recorded in data
logs for later analysis. In addition, video, voice, and chat communications were recorded.
Manipulation of Control Structure
Control structure was manipulated: half of all mission trials were executed in a
centralized control structure (the other half were decentralized; trials were counterbalanced). Centralization entailed all WDs requesting permission to commit all acts
through the SD (see Appendix E for figure of team layout and communication loop).
Under these conditions, the SD had the ultimate say in whether a WD engaged an enemy
fighter, engaged a ground targets, launched or transferred assets, or returned an asset to
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base. During decentralized control conditions, WDs had the authority to commit all acts
without requesting permission from the SD.
A-Typical Mission Scenario
Both teams performed through fifty trials that were divided into five blocks of ten
trials each. During the fifth, sixth, or seventh trial of each block, both teams experienced
a non-typical mission scenario that consisted of enemy targets unfamiliar to participants,
such as mobile tanks, soldiers, helicopters, or trucks. The purpose of these trials was to
observe team behavior during particularly surprising mission scenarios.
AWACS WD Team Performance
As mentioned above, the multi-dimensional nature of performance within
complex domains is represented by process and outcome-related metrics. To reiterate,
processes are the means for transforming or moving from one system state to another,
whereas outcomes represent changes or consequences resulting from processes.
Quantitative outcome-related metrics. Outcome performance on the DDD
AWACS battle management task is operationally defined using four quantitative
(dependent) measures:
1. Number of ground targets destroyed: A measure of the number of ground
targets successfully destroyed by the AWACS team/individual. The
ground targets are an element of the ATO and represent mission
requirements. The more ground targets destroyed relative to the mission
requirements, the better the performance.

66

a. Number of prime targets destroyed: A measure of the number of
targets destroyed as listed on the ATO (i.e., all ground targets
minus mobile SAM sites).
b. Number of mobile surface to air missile (SAM) sites destroyed. A
measure of the number of SAM sites eliminated. Destroying
mobile SAM sites is a measure of defensive performance in that
they actively attack friendly forces and are not primary targets.
2. Number of enemy aircraft destroyed: A measure of the number of enemy
aircraft the AWACS team/individual successfully destroy. Enemy aircraft
randomly arrive during the scenario and follow arbitrary trajectories. The
more enemy aircraft destroyed, the safer the high value assets (i.e., UAVs
and tankers).
3. Number of friendly assets lost to (ground and airborne) enemy attack. A
measure of the number of friendly assets (i.e., bombers, UAVs, fighters,
and tankers) lost to enemy attack. One of the main objectives of AWACS
crews is to ensure the safety of friendly aircraft. Thus the more friendly
assets lost, the worse the team performance.
a. Number of high value assets (HVA) lost to enemy attack. A
measure of the number of tankers and UAVs lost to enemy attack.
A major objective of AWACS crews is to ensure the safety of
HVAs.
4. Number of friendly assets lost due to fuel depletion. A measure of the
number of assets lost to inadequate fuel. Maintaining adequate fuel levels
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and coordinating re-fueling is a major responsibility of the Tanker WD and
the other WDs. The more assets lost to fuel loss, the worse the
performance.
Qualitative outcome-related metrics. After the completion of each DDD mission
scenario, subjects were required to complete an electronic survey that purportedly reveals
subjects’ beliefs about their performance and their team’s performance. Additionally the
electronic survey reveals subjects’ beliefs about important aspects of each mission, i.e.,
strategies utilized, salient events, and potential future strategies. Ultimately, a qualitative
analysis of individual beliefs about their team’s performance and what was important
during the mission permitted comparisons within teams and the opportunity to understand
how individuals’ strategies develop across trials.
After the completion of individual assessments, the team met face-to face to
discuss what happened during the mission and to construct a joint belief assessment of
how they performed, what strategies were important, and what should be done through
future missions. During the mission de-briefing, the team jointly completed an electronic
survey that purportedly reveals the teams’ beliefs about each mission and their teams’
performance. These data were examined in the same manner as the individual
assessments (see above) in order to determine salient aspects of mission scenarios,
strategy development, and learning.
Process-Related Performance
Quantitative metrics. Performance measures related to team coordination
processes are operationally defined using four quantitative measures.
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1.

Number of times Rules of Engagement (ROE) not followed. A measure of
the number of times WDs (controlling fighters and bombers) and the SO
(controlling UAVs) do not coordinate when destroying enemy ground
targets and the number of times civilians are killed (additive). Following
the ROE is an important responsibility for all military personnel –
coordinating attacks between fighters and UAVs and not killing civilians
are important rules of engagement in the DDD scenarios. Thus the more
un-coordinated attacks and civilians killed, the worse the performance.

2. Number of friendly asset transfers. A measure of the number of times
WDs transferred their assets/roles to another WD. The number of asset
transfer is directly related to the amount of coordination occurring during
a scenario. Thus I posit that there will be a positive linear relation
between number of asset transfers and performance.
3. Number of communications between WDs. A measure of the number of
times WDs communicated using the available communication
technologies.
4. Number of friendly assets launched. A measure of the number of times
WDs launch fighters, bombers, or UAVs from the air-base. Launching too
many assets may hinder performance because of an inability to control
excessive aircraft. However, launching too few assets may limit the WDs’
ability to control the enemy airspace.
Workload Metric. NASA TLX was utilized to assess subjective workload (Hart
& Staveland, 1987). The NASA TLX is a subjective workload assessment tool that
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allows users to perform subjective workload assessments on operator(s) working with
various human-machine systems. NASA TLX is a multi-dimensional rating procedure
that derives an overall workload score based on an average of low to high ratings on six
subscales: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and
frustration.

70

CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION IN AN AWACS SYNTHETIC
TASK
A major driver of this research was to demonstrate the potential for exploring
joint learning and performance through a simulated, complex work domain (i.e., AWACS
BMC2). Specifically, by exploiting the opportunities provided by a synthetic
environment, this research was directed at understanding the behavior of a simulated
AWACS BMC2 team through a science of complexity, as opposed to a science supported
by reduction and simplification. From the vantage point of complexity, a STE was
developed to represent the meaningful dimensions (determined through several CWAs)
of the AWACS BMC2 work domain and missions were constructed to afford operators
an experience of domain constraints. With mission objective outlined in missionspecific ATOs, two trained teams (each) jointly worked through fifty dynamic and
complex (15 minute) mission scenarios under varying conditions of organizational
centralization (i.e., centralization versus de-centralization). For communication,
operators were provided with a variety of technologies, including radio, chat, and a
virtual whiteboard. Observing team behavior across missions provided an opportunity to
understand how agents learned domain constraints and, in turn, jointly developed
effective control solutions to dynamic situational problems. In other words, both teams
were considered individually and together, as case studies that could be observed and
evaluated to better understand how they made sense of, and controlled, the simulated
AWACS BMC2 domain.
Case Studies
Case studies involve an in-depth, longitudinal evaluation of one or more cases
(e.g., events, instances) and provide a systematic way of looking at events, exploring
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information, and reporting results. Yin (2002) states that case studies can be based on
any combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Case studies can be used to
understand the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of team dynamics and decision making by organizing
data into patterns. Thus, case study data can be linked to theoretical propositions by
using a ‘pattern-matching’ technique, i.e., whereby several pieces of information from the
same case may be related to some theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975).
Below, are two case studies representing both qualitative and quantitative
accounts of Teams 1 and 2 coping with uncertainty through the AWACS BMC2 domain,
as represented by a STE. Both case studies are presented together to draw attention to
similar and contrasting behavioral patterns. The first data presented below reveal the
effects of centralized versus de-centralized conditions on team performance and
workload. Next, quantitative and qualitative data patterns are explored, providing
evidence for organizational learning. In particular, the macro- and micro-structure of
experimental data are explored to expose global variable patterns (i.e., learning trends).
Finally, judgments related to actual performance outcomes and congruence among agent
beliefs will be related to team performance.
Organizational Centralization
For the present study, teams were either centralized (i.e., WDs were required to
request permission to commit any actions through the SD) or de-centralized (i.e., WDs
were not required to request permission to commit actions). The effects of centralization
were determined for outcome-related performance (i.e., targets: ground, air, SAM; loss:
fuel-related, enemy-related), process-related performance (i.e., transfers and launches),
workload, and common situation-awareness.
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Outcome-Related Performance
Outcome measures address the actual results achieved and the impact of a team.
For the present study, outcome-related performance measures were either loss-related
(i.e., losses to fuel or to enemy) or target-related (i.e., prime targets, air targets, and
SAMs). Across trials, we expected degree of centralization to significant effect all
outcome-related performance metrics. Specifically, we expected both teams to eliminate
more targets (i.e., prime, air, and SAMS) under de-centralized conditions because
operators could quickly and autonomously eliminate ground targets without the
additional time delays associated with requesting and receiving permission. Additionally,
we expected more losses due to enemy attack during centralized conditions because
rapid-responses to enemy attack would be slowed by permission requests. We did not
expect organizational differences to effect losses due to fuel.
Results concerning the effects of centralization on outcome-related performance
were mixed. Results from both teams do not indicate a significant effect of centralization
condition on loss-related performance (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). However, results were
mixed in terms of the effect of centralization condition on outcome-related targeting
performance. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests indicated that both Teams 1 and 2 eliminated
significantly more air targets during de-centralized conditions [(Team 1: Centralized: M =
23.72, SD = 6.40; De-centralized: M = 28.56, SD = 5.14); (z = 1.84, N – ties = 16, p <
.05, two tailed); (Team 2: Centralized: M = 26.44, SD = 6.17; De-centralized: M = 31.67,
SD = 4.96); (z = 2.47, N – ties = 17, p < .05, two tailed); see Figures 5.3 and 5.4].
Additionally, Team 1 eliminated more SAM targets during de-centralized conditions
(Centralized: M = 1.70; SD = 1.24; De-centralized: M = 2.5; SD = .92); (z = 2.02, N – ties
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= 14, p < .05, two tailed). On the other hand, Team 2 eliminated significantly more
prime targets during centralized conditions (Centralized: M = 7.06, SD = 1.95; Decentralized: M = 5.89, SD = 2.08); (z = 2.04, N – ties = 16, p < .05, two tailed).
Team 1 Outcome-Loss Performance vs Centralization Condition
20

Score (Count)

15

Cent Enemy Loss **
Cent Fuel Loss ***
Decent Enemy Loss
Decent Fuel Loss **

10

5

0

Early
1

6

Intermediate
11

16

Later

Trial Period

Figure 5.1. Team 1: outcome-related performance concerning losses due
to fuel loss and enemy attack. Out of a total of 35 friendly assets.
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Team 2 Outcome-Loss Performance vs Centralization Condition
20

Score (Count)

15

Cent Enemy Loss
Cent Fuel Loss
Decent Enemy Loss *
Decent Fuel Loss ***

10

5

0

Early
1

6

Intermediate
11

16

Later

Trial Period

Figure 5.2. Team 2: outcome-related performance concerning losses due
to fuel loss and enemy attack. Out of a total of 35 friendly assets.
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Team 1 Outcome-Target Performance vs Centralization Condition
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Later
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Figure 5.3. Team 1: outcome-related performance concerning targets
eliminated. Out of 15 prime targets and 5 SAM sites per mission.
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Team 2 Outcome-Target Performance vs Centralization Condition
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11
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Figure 5.4. Team 2: outcome-related performance concerning targets
eliminated. Out of 15 prime targets and 5 SAM sites per mission.
The mixed outcome performance results may have something to do with the
nature of the targets. Both air and SAM targets represent more defense-oriented targets –
neither is indicated on the ATO, but both represent a clear and present danger to friendly
assets and prevent the accomplishment of mission objectives. Specifically, enemy air
targets converge on friendly assets, thereby preventing access to priority targets and
potentially killing friendly assets. Similarly, mobile SAM sites target friendly assets
within their range. Conversely, prime targets represent offensive-oriented targets that are
explicitly outlined in the ATO as priority mission objectives. Perhaps, both Teams
eliminated more defense-oriented targets during de-centralized conditions because they
did not have to request permission from the SD – thus, they were keen to attack nonpriority targets instead of avoiding them. In terms of Team 2’s elimination of more
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priority targets during centralized control conditions, we do not have a specific
explanation.
Process-Related Performance
Both asset launches and transfers are characterized as process-related
performance. As mentioned earlier, processes represent the actions or ‘means’ that cause
a sequence of changes in the properties of a system. Processes are the means for
transforming or moving from one system state to another. Thus, launching and
transferring assets changes the configuration and dynamics of mission scenarios. Across
trials, we expected operators to launch and transfer more assets during de-centralized
conditions because without SD constraint operators would be free to launch and transfer
assets according to mission demands without SD’s potential veto – and, the added burden
of requesting SD for permission. However, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests indicated that
across trials for both Team 1 and Team 2, centralization condition did not significantly
affect process-related performance (Team 1: Launches: (z = 1.40, N – ties = 16, p >.05,
two tailed); Transfers: (z = .03, N – ties = 15, p > .05, two tailed; Team 2: Launches: (z =
.16, N – ties = 14, p > .05, two tailed); Transfers: (z = .67, N – ties = 17, p > .05, two
tailed); see Figures 5.5 and 5.6). In other words, centralization conditions did not affect
the number of asset launches or transfers across trials for either Team 1 or 2.
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Team 1 Process-Related Performance vs Centralization Condition
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Figure 5.5. Team 1: Process-related performance by centralization
condition across trial periods.
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Team 2 Process-Related Performance vs Centralization Condition
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Figure 5.6. Team 2: Process-related performance by centralization
condition across trial periods.
Workload
Subjective workload was evaluated using a modified version of the NASA TLX
(Hart & Staveland, 1987; see above). We expected significantly higher perceived
workload ratings for centralized conditions compared to de-centralized conditions. In
particular, we expected that the added responsibility of requesting permission through the
SD during centralized conditions – an additional constraint on action for the operators,
would lead to higher perceived workload than during conditions where operators did not
experience the additional action constraint. Results for Team 1 indicate no significant
effect of centralization condition on perceived workload (see Figure 5.7). However,
results from a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test indicate that Team 2 perceived significantly
higher workload during centralized conditions (Centralized: M = 63.33, SD = 2.64;
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Decentralized: M = 60.89, SD = 2.40); (z = 2.44, N – ties = 17, p < .05, two tailed)
thereby partially confirming our expectation that higher workload would be perceived
during centralized conditions.
Team 1 & Team 2 Workload vs Centralization Condition
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Figure 5.7. Teams 1 and 2: perceived workload by centralization
condition.
A potential explanation for the lack of a significant effect of centralization
condition on perceived workload for Team 1 is that they incorporated a ‘work-around’
strategy to cope with the added burden of requesting permission (see section below on
organizational learning and constraints on information). Although, the evidence
primarily comes from open-ended responses (the chat data do not differentiate between
team), Team 1 appears to have incorporated a strategy of utilizing the chat tool to
perform redundant requests for permission from the SD (beginning trial 3; see below).
Specifically, after trial 2, Team 1’s open-ended survey indicates a “suggestion for SD to
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use IM so to increase speed of communication”. Additionally, after trial 3, “all”
operators on Team 2 “agreed SD should continue to use IM”. Finally, after trial 11,
Team 1 responds, “all agree much easier and less radio chatter without having to ask SD
permission”. On the other hand, from the open-ended response data, it appears that Team
2 did not adopt a similar strategy – thus, utilizing the radio channel across trials.
Open-ended surveys indicated that both teams were frustrated by the centralized
conditions. For example, Team 2’s Checkin WD (after trial 21) reports in an open-ended
response that “having to ask permission from SD raises the frustration, slows the moves,
makes us as targets more vulnerable due to the time it takes to defend ourselves or launch
planes to defend ourselves.” Additionally, after trial 23, Team 1’s SO reports that
“without SD we function as a single unit” and they maintain the “belief that
reintroduction of SD slows team down and causes reduction in scores”. Also, after trial
31, Team 1’ Checkin WD notes that they “had to ask SD permission and this upped the
temporal demand as I tried not to die while asking for permission”. Finally, in Team 2’s
‘team’ open-ended briefing after trial 11, they indicate, “having to request permission
from SD has a severe impact on quick responses.” Thus, it appears that both teams
perceived added ‘workload’ and frustration from the requirement to request permission
from the SD. Specifically, operators believed that centralized conditions imposed a
severe temporal constraint on their ability to rapidly respond to mission dynamics and,
therefore made assets vulnerable to enemy attack.
Results from NASA TLX ratings across all conditions reveal relatively consistent
workload responses across Team 2, whereas Team 1’s workload ratings exhibited a
significant positive trend across trials; t(43) = 6.61, p <.001 (see Figure 5.7).
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Additionally, analyses indicate a significant difference between Team 1 and Team 2’s
perceived workload (Team 1: M = 48.02, SD = 5.34; Team 2: M = 61.86, SD = 2.69).
t(44) = -16.75, p < .05. When workload data are plotted separately for centralization
condition and per operator (see Figures 5.8), it appears that both Teams’ perceptions of
workload increase across trials during centralized conditions, but remain relatively
consistent across de-centralized conditions. One possible explanation as to why
centralized conditions led each Team’s perceived workload to exhibit significant positive
trends, whereas de-centralized conditions did not have the same effect is that frustration
under centralized conditions could increase with skill and confidence in the task. That is,
as operators become more confident in their own decisions it is more frustrating to have
to get permission. Analyses of both Teams’ operator perceived frustration (NASA TLX
sub-scale item) does not support this conclusion (see Figure 5.9). Indeed, it only appears
that Team 2’s Tanker WD’s data during de-centralized conditions and both Team’s SO’s
data during centralized and Team 2’s SO during de-centralized conditions exhibit a
significant positive trend across trials.
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Figure 5.8. Teams 1 and 2: perceived workload (NASA TLX totals) for
each operator across centralized and de-centralized conditions.
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Figure 5.9. Teams 1 and 2: perceived frustration (NASA TLX sub-scale)
for each operator across centralized and de-centralized conditions.
Overall, results concerning the effects of centralized versus de-centralized
conditions on performance are mixed. In general, the data acquired from the present
study do not support any firm conclusions about the effects of either centralization
condition on process-related or outcome-related performance. However, results from
open-ended responses and the NASA TLX (for Team 2) indicate that centralized
conditions lead to perceptions of higher ‘workload’, frustration, and a reduction in
performance. Indeed, it seems intuitive that the magnitude of the time-delay due to
requesting and receiving permission to commit acts within the battlespace would have an
effect on workload and performance, such that higher time-delays would reduce
performance (agents would have less time to respond to time-critical events) and increase
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frustration. Further research is required to better understand the effects of organizational
centralization and the magnitude of time-delays on performance and workload.
Organizational Learning
In the previous chapters, the scale of complexity was defined according to the
degree of coupling and dimensionality characterizing a system. When systems exhibit
high complexity (i.e., loose coupling and high dimensionality), the maintenance of
stability becomes problematic: standards and plans (i.e., effective control strategies for
tightly coupled, low dimensional systems) are not effective because the variety exhibited
by the domain is greater than the variety inherent to solutions. Thus, continuous
organizational learning through mutual adjustment was presented as an adaptive process
of stabilizing complex work domains.
Evidence for learning will first be explored by identifying significant process- and
outcome-related performance trends at the macro-level. Specifically, performance data
plotted across trials and centralization conditions reveals significant positive and negative
trends that are related to learning. Next, process- and outcome-related performance will
be examined at the micro-level to determine a) the relevance of specific temporal periods
on learning and b) patterns of cross-correlations among performance measures. In
addition, global variable patterns at the macro- and micro-level will be described in terms
of specific adaptive control strategies employed by teams through mission scenarios.
Macro-Structure of Data
Outcome-related targeting performance. Across trials, for both Teams, we
expected significant positive trends for the number of prime targets eliminated, air
targets, and SAM sites. Specifically, we believed that through experience with mission
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scenarios, Teams would learn to eliminate greater numbers of prime targets, in part by
learning how to cope with (i.e., eliminate) potentially threatening enemy assets (i.e., air
targets and SAM sites). For both teams, data trends across trials indicate significant
positive trends in number of prime targets eliminated (Team 1: t(43) = 3.89, p .001; Team
2: t(43) = 7.21, p < .05; see Figure 5.10). Although, Team 2’s prime target performance
significantly differed across centralization conditions (see above), during both centralized
and de-centralized conditions a significant positive trend in prime targets eliminated is
observed (centralized: t(16) = 2.07, p <.05; de-centralized: t(16) = 5.15, p < .05; see
Figure 5.10). Additionally, data for both Teams indicate significant positive trends for
number of SAM sites eliminated (Team 1: t(43) = 3.21, p < .05; Team 2: t(43) = 2.61, p <
.05; see Figure 5.10). However, when considering the significant difference in number of
SAM sites eliminated by Team 1 during different centralization conditions, data only
indicate a significant positive trend in number of SAM sites eliminated during centralized
conditions; t(16) = 2.78, p < .05 (see Figure 5.10). Finally, for Team 1 data indicate a
significant positive trend in the number of air targets eliminated during centralized
conditions; t(16) = 2.31, p < .05 (see Figure 5.10).
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Figure 5.10. Teams 1 and 2: data trends for primary target performance,
SAM target performance, air target performance, and losses to enemy
attack performance by centralization condition.
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From the above data it appears that both Teams learned to eliminate more prime
targets across trials. For Team 1, the number of prime targets eliminated remained
constant until half way through the experiment, and then there is a step increase to a
higher level (from trial 22 to 50; intermediate through later trial periods). Perhaps, this is
due to a qualitative shift in strategy led to an increase in the number of prime targets
eliminated (the Checkin WD assisted in eliminating ground targets; see below). In terms
of Team 2, the number of prime targets eliminated appears to increase at a relatively
stable rate (Team 2 did not exhibit the same qualitative shift in strategy as Team 1).
Eliminating prime targets is an integral function of the AWACS BMC2 team as
outlined in the ATO. Indeed, both Teams recognized the importance of concentrating
effort on eliminating prime targets and improving performance. For example, after trial
24, Team 1’s Tanker WD commented in the open-ended survey that the Team “did a
good job, we took out all the primary targets”. In addition, Teams recognized
improvements in their targeting performance – for example, after trial 14, Team 2’s
Tanker WD commented in the open-ended survey, “we improved from last time, we
communicated very well and attacked more ground targets”. Thus, Teams learned to
make prime targets a priority and believed that they were learning to effectively execute
this objective.
Both Teams believed that at least part of their outcome-related performance
improvement was due to enhanced coordination among operators. For example, after
trial 42, Team 1’s SD commented in the open-ended survey that, “Tanker, Checkin, and
SO work together as a team well with Tanker bombing ground targets while Checkin
provides support. As a team they follow the priorities on the ATO list well”. Also, after
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trial 2, Team 2’s Tanker WD comments on the open-ended survey, “I think we did really
well in communicating with each other that time, we had great teamwork in destroying
our ground targets. AOR and I worked great together in re-fueling and restocking our
aircrafts and targeting the enemy’s planes. So, over all I think we did much better and I
think we improve each and every time we do a mission”. Finally, after trial 38, Team 2’s
Tanker WD comments in the open-ended survey, “we coordinated attacks quickly and
managed to take out a lot of ground targets”. From the above sample of comments and
the significant trends in targeting performance, it appears that both Teams learned to
effectively coordinate and communicate in order to accomplish the mission objective of
eliminating prime targets.
Both Teams appear to eliminate SAM sites at a relatively consistent rate across
trials. Although, SAM sites were not a priority, they were potential threats to friendly
assets and eliminating them provided assurance against potential friendly losses.
Additionally, air targets were a potential threat to friendly assets. For Team 1, as
mentioned above, there is a significant positive trend in the number of air targets
eliminated during centralized conditions. We believe that this is associated with the
elimination of enemy air bases (see Figure 5.11). Specifically, the more enemy air bases
eliminated within the first seven minutes of a scenario (there were three enemy air bases
per mission), the fewer enemy air assets launched into the AOR (note: as a performance
metric, elimination of an enemy air base did not include potential enemy air assets that, in
‘real’ circumstances would be present at the air base; only the enemy air base was
counted as an eliminated target). Although the micro-structure of the data will be
discussed below, it is important to note that for Team 1, the number of air targets
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eliminated was positively correlated with number of enemy air bases eliminated during
centralized conditions; r = .27; t(34) = 3.28, p< .05 (correlations were not significant for
Team 2 or Team 1 under de-centralized conditions). Although, it appears that the number
of air targets eliminated for Team 1 during centralized conditions is related to an increase
in number of airbases eliminated, we cannot establish a direction of causation.
Phase Space: Team 1 Number of Enemy Air Bases Eliminated x Number of Air
Targets Eliminated x Trial Period: Centralization Condition
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Figure 5.11. Team 1: phase-space of the number of enemy air bases x air
targets eliminated x time during centralization conditions.
Outcome-related asset loss performance. We expected that for both Teams,
across trials, negative trends would be exhibited for asset losses due to fuel depletion and
enemy attack. This expectation is based on our belief that Teams would learn how to
cope with fuel concerns and enemy attacks. In terms of losses due to fuel depletion, data
for both Teams indicate significant negative trends across all trials (Team 1: t(43) = 4.32,
p < .05; Team 2: t(43) = 2.78, p < .05; see Figure 5.10). In terms of assets lost to enemy
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attack, Team 1’s data indicate a significant positive trend in the number of assets lost to
enemy attack across all trials t(43) = 4.32, p < .05 (see Figure 5.10). Thus, both Teams
learned to cope with fuel concerns whereas neither Team learned to manage enemy
attacks – indeed, Team 1’s management of enemy attacks has decreased.
For both Teams, significant negative trends in the amount of friendly assets lost to
fuel depletion appear to be consistent across trials. Indeed, during the second half of the
experiments, both Teams appear to have reduced the number of assets lost to fuel
depletion to near zero levels. On the other hand, the number of assets lost to enemy
attacks for both Teams appears to be variable across trials. Again, the number of friendly
assets lost to enemy attack might be associated with the number of enemy air bases
eliminated during the first seven minutes of each scenario (see last section on enemy air
targets). There is some support for this for Team 2 during centralized conditions –
number of enemy losses is positively correlated with number of enemy air bases
eliminated, r = .36; t(34) = 2.25, p < .05. However, we cannot explain the remainder of
the variability in losses to enemy attack.
For Team 1, around half way through the experiment, there appears to be a sharp
increase in the number of assets lost to enemy attack during centralized conditions (and,
Team 1’s losses to enemy attack exhibit a significant positive trend across trials). We
believe that this also is associated with the qualitative shift in strategy exhibited by Team
1 (discussed below). In particular, we believe it is associated with Checkin WD’s efforts
to manage additional friendly assets in the AOR. Specifically, starting around half way
through the experiment, Team 1’s Checkin WD learned to manage friendly assets –
initially, more assets were lost to enemy attack and as the Checkin WD learned to
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manage more assets (although, the number of assets lost to enemy attack did not reduce
to levels displayed prior to the shift in strategy, this was probably due to the increased
risk of launching more aircraft).
Data from open-ended surveys indicate that both Teams learned to recognize fuel
concerns and learned to manage losses due to fuel depletion. Indeed, after trial 8, Team 1
commented that they “need to keep a closer eye on the fuel”; after trial 10, Team 1
commented, “too many planes are going down due to lack of fuel. Tanker asks that
teammates are vigilant on checking their fuel and inform him in ample time to restock
and refuel”. In terms of Team 2’s comments, after trial 2, AOR WD comments, “we
managed to keep planes in the air longer, we actually re-fueled!” Referring to Team 2’s
coping with fuel concerns, after trial 4, Tanker WD comments, “I think that we improved
on refueling”, and after trial 5, Tanker WD comments, “overall we did a real good job
refueling and working as a team…” Thus, both Teams appear to have learned to pay
attention to fuel concerns and to coordinate re-fueling with Tanker WDs.
Process-related performance. We did not expect a particular trend in the number
of assets launched and transferred across trials. On the one hand, we believed that across
trials Teams might exhibit a negative trend in launches and transfers because they learned
to lose fewer assets to fuel depletion and enemy attack. However, on the other hand, we
thought that across trials Teams might exhibit a positive trend in launches and transfers
because they learned how to simultaneously manage multiple assets and continuously
transfer roles and responsibilities. Results from both Teams process-related performance
indicate a significant negative trend in the number of assets transferred across trials
(Team 1: t(43) = 3.49, p < .05; Team 2: t(43) = 3.04, p < .05; see Figure 5.10).
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Additionally, results from Team 2 indicate a significant negative trend in the number of
asset launches across trials; t(43) = 4.79, p < .05 (see Figure 5.10).
For Team 1, launches and transfers appear to move in parallel during the first half
of the experiment. However, after the second half of the experiment, launches and
transfers appear to diverge – the number of transfers seems to decline relative to
launches. We believe that this divergence is due to a qualitative shift in Team 1’s
performance strategy during the second half of the experiment wherein the Checkin WD
maintained control over friendly assets, thereby transferring fewer of them to other
operators (see below for more on this). For Team 2, launches and transfers appear to
move in parallel across all trials. We believe that this is due to the Checkin WD
systematically launching and transferring assets to operators – Team 2’s Checkin WD did
not maintain control over friendly assets (as Team 1’s Checkin WD did during later
trials).
In this section, the macro-structure of outcome- and process-related performance
data were discussed in terms of significant linear trends across trials. To offer some
qualitative support to general learning trends, open-ended responses from individual and
team surveys were related to the quantitative data. Overall, it appears that across trials,
both Teams learned to cope with fuel concerns and progressively eliminate more targets
(prime targets were of particular importance, but they also learned to eliminate more
SAM sites). In the next section, the micro-structure of performance data will be explored
in detail to expose a general qualitative shift in strategy for Team 1.
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Micro-Structure of Data and Qualitative Shifts in Strategy and Performance
To get a more detailed understanding of the learning processes, we parsed the data
into temporal segments and examined correlations among the various measures.
Specifically, to explore learning trends during different temporal periods of trials, data
were parsed into segments within trials – during early, intermediate, and later periods of
trials. Parsing data along temporal phases of battle has the potential to reveal mission
events that might only show up during a specific temporal period of trials. Additionally,
individual performance metrics were correlated to uncover specific goal trade-offs and/or
priority shifts.
Micro-level trends. For both Teams, performance data were split up into three
temporal periods: early (i.e., the first four minutes of trials), intermediate (i.e., the second
four minutes of trials), and later (i.e., the final six minutes of trials; see Tables 5.1 and
5.2). First, for both Teams, during the intermediate period of trials, data indicate
significant negative trends in assets lost to fuel (Team 1: t(43) = 4.32, p < .05; Team 2:
t(43) = 4.58, p < .05). Results can be explained in terms of the characteristics of assets in
all mission scenarios – upon starting each mission, assets have a variable amount of fuel
that will last several minutes into each scenario. Ultimately, assets crash if they are not
refueled by the intermediate point of scenarios. Thus, from the data, it appears that
across trials, both teams learned to lose fewer assets to fuel depletion (that would
typically occur during the intermediate point of trials).
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Table 5.1
Pearson-r Values for Team 1: Cumulative and Temporal Performance

Performance
Metric
Grnd Trgts

Early = 4
min.
.32+ *

Inter = 8
min.
.26+ *

Late = 14
min.
.33+ *

Prime Trgts

Cum
.52+ ***
.51+ ***

Air Trgts

.14+

.14+

.00+

.10+

Enemy Loss

.14+

.36+ **

.33+ *

.48+ **

Fuel Loss

.00+

.55- ***

.00-

.55- ***

Launches

.14+

.10-

.10-

.14+

Transfers

.10+

.28- *

.41- **

.42- **

HVA Loss

.17+

.17+

.35+ **

.37+ **

SAM Def

.44+ **

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Table 5.2
Pearson-r Values for Team 2: Cumulative and Temporal Performance

Performance
Metric
Grnd Trgts

Early = 4
min.
.50+ ***

Inter = 8
min.
.32+ *

Late = 14
min.
.44+ **

Prime Trgts

Cum
.69+ ***
.73+ ***

Air Trgts

.14+

.24+

.10+

.22+

Enemy Loss

.00-

.10-

.14-

.22-

Fuel Loss

N/A

.46- **

.00+

.39- **

Launches

.10+

.10-

.59- ***

.59- ***

Transfers

.24+

.10-

.60- ***

.47- **

HVA Loss

.17+

.00+

.10+

.14+

SAM Def

.37+ **

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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In terms of ground targets eliminated during trials, micro-trends support a general,
positive linear trend in number of ground targets eliminated through trials (see above
section on macro-structure). In regard to micro-level trends in Team 1’s performance,
losses to enemy attack exhibit positive trends during intermediate and later trial periods,
HVA losses exhibit significant positive trends during later trial periods. We believe that
the discrepancy between Team 1 and Team 2’s process-related (i.e., asset launches and
transfers) and air target performance data and was associated with a qualitative shift in
strategy employed by Team 1, but not Team 2 (see below). Thus, Team 1’s data did not
indicate any significant trend in terms of asset transfers, but exhibited a negative trend in
number of transfers during intermediate and later periods of trials. Team 2, on the other
hand, displayed significant negative trends in number of launches and transfers during
later trial periods. These data imply that Team 1’s Checkin WD launched a consistent
amount of assets throughout each trial, yet transferred fewer assets (i.e., instead,
personally managed) as missions proceeded. Similarly, after launching necessary assets
for operators during early periods of trials, Team 1’s Checkin WD managed additional
assets – that were lost to enemy attack, explaining the positive micro-level trends in
losses to enemy attack during intermediate and later trials. Conversely, Team 2’s
Checkin WD launched and transferred consistently during early and intermediate periods
of trials, whereas they launched and transferred significantly fewer assets during later
trial periods (note the similarities in trends).
Performance measure relationships. Performance measures were cross-correlated
to reveal potential relationships (i.e., goal trade-offs and/or priority shifts) among
process- and outcome-related performance variables (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). By
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exploring data patterns across temporal periods of performance, cross-correlations among
performance variables and qualitative open-ended survey data obtained from the
individual- and team-level, qualitative shifts in team strategy and performance are
revealed.
Table 5.3
Pearson-r Values and Significance for Team 1: Performance Measure Correlation
Matrix
Performance
Air
Enemy
Metric
Trgts
Loss
Grnd Trgts
.20 *
.04+
Air Trgts
.22- *
Enemy Loss
Fuel Loss
Launches
Prime Trgts
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Fuel Loss
.32- **
.00
.41- ***

Launches
.12.09.47+ ***
.15-

Transfers
.36- ***
.11.06+
.32+ **
.42+ ***

SAM
N/A
.19+ *
.29+ **
.13.02+
.43+ ***

Table 5.4
Pearson-r Values and Significance for Team 2: Performance Measure Correlation
Matrix
Performance
Air
Enemy
Metric
Trgts
Loss
Grnd Trgts
.00
.08Air Trgts
.01Enemy Loss
Fuel Loss
Launches
Prime Trgts
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Fuel Loss
Launches
.37- ***
.40- ***
.14+
.15.24- *
.65+ ***
.28+ **

Transfers
.28- **
.13.65+ ***
.29+ **
.96+ ***

SAM
N/A
.02.03+
.33- ***
.20- *
.48+ ***

Although, we had expectations when it came to trends in the macro-structure of
the data (see above), we did not have any specific expectations regarding micro-level
performance measure relationships - although, we expected that performance measures
would be correlated to a moderate degree due to the nature of sampling performance from
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a work domain (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff, and Mackenzie; 1995).
Specifically, performance measures collected through the experiment are all related to
behaviors and outcomes exhibited by Teams – it is normal for those behaviors and
outcomes to be related.
For both Teams 1 and 2, it appears that losses due to fuel depletion is negatively
associated with the number of ground targets eliminated (Team 1: t(88) = 3.17, p < .05;
Team 2: t(88) = 3.74, p< .05; see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Indeed, losing assets to fuel would
limit the number of assets available to eliminate ground targets. Similarly, one would
expect the elimination of SAM sites to be related to number of prime targets eliminated
because SAM sites pose an immediate threat to friendly assets attempting to eliminate
prime targets. Indeed, for both Teams, number of SAM sites eliminated is positively
related to number of prime targets eliminated (Team 1: t(88) = 4.47, p < .05; Team 2:
t(88) = 5.13, p < .05; see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
For both Teams, transfers appear to be negatively related to ground targets
eliminated (Team 1: t(88) = 3.62, p < .05; Team 2: t(88) = 2.74, p < .05; see Tables 5.3
and 5.4). However, only Team 2 displays a negative correlation for number of launches
and ground targets eliminated; t(88) = 3.74, p < .05 (see Table 5.4). Perhaps, this
discrepancy is related to a qualitative shift in Team 1’s strategy. Specifically, perhaps
Team 1’s Checkin WD is launching and holding onto assets, instead of transferring them
to other operators. Below, details concerning how these patterns relate to a qualitative
shift in Team 1’s performance will be discussed.
For both Teams, transfers are positively related to launches (Team 1: t(88) = 4.34,
p .001; Team 2: t(88) = 32.16, p < .05; see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). However, correlations
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among process-related performance metrics are particularly strong for Team 2,
accounting for around 92 percent of the variance (compared to 18 percent for Team 1).
Of related interest, losses due to enemy attack are positively correlated with number of
launches for Team 1; t(88) = 5.00, p < .05, but not with transfers, whereas for Team 2,
losses due to enemy attack are correlated with both launches and transfers (launches:
t(88) = 8.02, p < .05; transfers: t(88) = 8.02, p < .05; see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Again, we
believe these process-related performance discrepancies between Teams 1 and 2 are
related to a qualitative shift in Team 1’s strategy (see below). In terms of correlations
among other process- and outcome-related performance metrics, we do not have any
specific explanations.
Qualitative shift in strategy. Across trials, an interesting pattern was discovered
across micro- and macro-levels of performance. This pattern was discussed in prior
sections on the macro-structure of performance data – in terms of improved prime target
elimination and increased asset losses to enemy, and in terms of micro-level trends in
performance data. We believe that patterns in the micro- and macro-structure of data
indicate a qualitative shift in Team 1’s strategy during the second half of the experiment.
Specifically, it appears that about half way through the experiment (around trial 22;
intermediate trial period) Team 1 employed a strategy of having the Checkin WD manage
friendly assets to assist in eliminating ground targets and provide close-air support.
Evidence for a shift in Team 1’s strategy can be seen half-way through trials in terms of
ground targets eliminated, assets lost to enemy attack, the discrepancy between processrelated performance coupling that is apparent across Team 2’s data, but not Team 1’s
data, and through Checkin WDs perceived workload.
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Qualitative data from open-ended surveys supports the argument that Team 1’s
Checkin WD assumes additional responsibility in terms of managing friendly assets. For
example, after trial 24, the SD indicated that “Checkin doing great at controlling airbase
and assets – great help to the team” and after trial 38, the SD indicated that “Checkin
contributing much to the team by controlling two F18s and being aggressive in her
attacks”. Qualitative data from Team 2’s open-ended surveys do not reveal any such
strategy.
From a quantitative perspective, Team 1’s qualitative shift in strategy is apparent.
Referring to Figure 5.3, about half-way through the trials (around trial 22; intermediate
trial period) there appears to be a positive step-function in the number of prime targets
eliminated during centralized conditions. This increase in number of assets eliminated is
most likely due to the Checkin WD elimination of additional ground targets. Similarly,
referring to Figure 5.1, about half-way through trials (around trial 22; intermediate trial
period) there appears to be a positive step-function in the number of losses due to enemy
attack during centralized conditions. According to experimenter observation, initially
Team 1’s Checkin WD had trouble keeping F18s in the air according to significant
positive micro-level trends in the number of assets lost to enemy attack (intermediate:
t(43) = 2.53, p < .05; later: t(43) = 2.29, p < .05). This would explain the increase in
number of assets lost to enemy attack half-way through the experiment. Finally, when
referring to Figure 5.6, it appears that Team 2’s launches and transfers mirror each other
across trials. In addition, for Team 2, about 92 percent of the variance in transfers is
associated with launches (and visa versa; see Table 5.4). Thus, Team 2’s Checkin WD is
consistently launching and then transferring assets to other operators (as opposed to
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managing those assets herself). In comparison to Team 2, it appears that Team 1’s
launches remain relatively constant (see section on macro-structure), however, a
significant negative trend is revealed for transfers – especially, half-way through the
experiment (see Figures 5.5). In addition, only about 18 percent of the variance in
transfers is associated with launches (and visa versa; see Table 5.3). Consequently, it
appears that Team 1’s Checkin WD is consistently launching similar numbers of assets
across trials, however, they are transferring those assets to other operators less frequently
toward the second-half of the experiment (i.e., personally managing those assets).
Tanker WD Workload & Centralization Condition

Checkin WD Workload & Centralization Condition
100
NASA TLX Rating

NASA TLX Rating

100
80
60
40
20
0

Early
1

6

Intermediate
11

80
60
40
20
0

Later
16

Early
1

6

Trial Period
Team 1 Cent *
Team 2 Cent **

Team 1 Decent
Team 2 Decent ***

Team 1 Cent *
Team 2 Cent

Team 1 Decent
Team 2 Decent

AOR WD Workload & Centralization Condition

100

100

80

NASA TLX Rating

NASA TLX Rating

Later
16

Trial Period

SO Workload & Centralization Condition

60
40
20
0

Intermediate
11

Early
1

6

Intermediate
11

60
40
20
0

Later
16

Trial Period
Team 1 Cent ***
Team 2 Cent *

80

Early
1

6

Intermediate
11

Later
16

Trial Period

Team 1 Decent
Team 2 Decent

Team 1 Cent
Team 2 Cent

Team 1 Decent
Team 2 Decent **

Figure 5.12. Teams 1 and 2: WD’s workload by centralization condition.
Although, process- and outcome-related performance data reveal changes in Team
1’s performance around half way through the experiment, one would also expect changes
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in Team 1’s Checkin WDs perceived workload around half way through the experiment
if they were, indeed, managing more assets and assuming additional responsibilities.
Referring to Figure 5.12, during centralized conditions, shortly after half way through the
experiment, there is a sharp increase in the Checkin WDs perceived workload. Thus, it
appears that Team 1’s Checkin WD is learning how to cope (after the high workload
spike, perceived workload appears to level off for the Checkin WD) with the additional
responsibility associated with controlling additional friendly assets for close-air support
and to eliminate ground targets.
The above evidence reveals a qualitative shift in Team 1’s performance across
trials. Specifically, Checkin WD’s management of assets during the second-half of the
experiment reveals itself through global variable patterns in performance measures.
Although, we expected to discover a greater number of global variable patterns across
both Teams’ quantitative and qualitative data, we believe that discovering the single
qualitative shift in strategy detailed above is a step in the right direction toward
understanding how teams dynamically cope with complex situations. Below, qualitative
data reveal specific adaptive strategies Teams employed to cope with dynamic and
complex scenarios.
Adaptive strategies. Open-ended surveys completed by individuals and Teams
reveal specific adaptive strategies discovered and employed by Teams to cope with
mission scenarios. One characteristic feature of these strategies involved asset clustering
to compensate for asset deficiencies and exploitation of asset capabilities. A second
characteristic feature of these strategies involved the transfer of primary responsibilities
among operators. Although, above, a qualitative shift in strategy was discussed in terms
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of transferring elements of Team 1’s AOR WD’s role to the Checkin WD, further,
qualitative evidence supports transfers of responsibility among other operators. A third
characteristic feature involves adapting mission priorities to the constraints of the enemy
AOR – specifically, by prioritizing specific assets for time-critical attack.
Both Teams learned to cluster assets together to exploit particular capabilities of
assets and compensate for asset vulnerabilities. Thus, bombers are capable of eliminating
up to four ground targets on a single restocking – however, they do not have any air-toair attack capabilities. Similarly, although the UAV has the capability of sensing ground
targets within a wide range and tankers have the capacity to refuel and restock friendly
assets, neither has the ability to defend against enemy air attack. Finally, despite the F18s
ability to eliminate up to four air targets, a maximum capacity of one air-ground attack
and limited ground sensing facilities makes them vulnerable to SAM sites and limits
ground targeting.
The UAV (SO operated) was capable of traversing the AOR in order to detect the
location of enemy ground targets. Although, UAVs were capable of ‘seeing’ ground
activity (whereas, other assets did not possess similar capabilities), they could not detect
enemy air activity that could destroy UAV assets. Thus, both teams learned to pair F18s
with the UAV (the AOR WD paired up with the SO) to protect the UAV from enemy air
attack. For example, after trial 11, Team 1’s Checkin WD commented that the “UAV
staying next to tanker with F18s support works well to keep UAV in air”. Similarly, after
trial 48, the SD commented on Team 2’s consistent protection of UAVs, “AOR does a
good job watching out for SO, e.g., although out of ammo, he stayed with SO so he could
warn him of air enemies”.
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Both Teams learned to cluster assets together to exploit restocking and refueling
capabilities of the tanker and the protection offered by the F18s. Tanker WDs had the
responsibility of restocking and refueling all friendly assets throughout the AOR. The
Tanker WDs were only allotted three tanker aircraft (not equipped with arms) to
accomplish this role. During each mission scenario, fighter and bomber assets were
distributed throughout the AOR, which was covered in enemy aircraft and mobile SAM
sites. Thus, moving tanker assets around the AOR in order to restock and/or refuel
friendly assets was contingent upon safe passage, which was rare. Consequently, each
team decided to group their tanker aircraft with fighters and/or bombers to ensure that
assets low on fuel/arms had supplies readily available and tanker assets had adequate
defenses. Team 1 employed two asset clusters, each consisting of a bomber, F18, tanker
and UAV (experimenter observation). For example, after trial 13, Team 1’s AOR WD
commented, “…worked much better as two teams…” and after trial 14, AOR WD
commented, “working as two separate teams works much more efficiently”. Similarly,
after trial 24, Team 1 commented, “…works well splitting into two attack teams and
covering opposite sides, will continue with that strategy. Restocking and refueling works
well with both teams.” Additionally, in terms of restocking and refueling, according to
Team 1’s Checkin WD after trial 37, “Tanker and AOR partnered and were able to
continually restock F18s so that the F18 could continue to strike ground targets” and after
trial 37, Team 1 commented, “better teamwork using Tanker to restock and refuel
immediately works well.” On the other hand, Team 2 employed one asset cluster
(experimenter observation). For example, after trial 34, Team 2’s AOR WD commented,
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“moving the tanker up to meet the fighter and bomber group for restocking and refueling
helped”.
A second characteristic of these strategies, alluded to above and apparent in
operator comments, involved adapting operator roles. Prior to engaging in missions, both
Teams’ members were given primary responsibilities. As mentioned above, the AOR
WD was primarily responsible for all fighters and bombers within the AOR; the Checkin
WD was responsible for launching and transferring all assets into the AOR; and the
Tanker WD was responsible for all tankers, i.e., restocking and refueling all assets. As
teams engaged in mission scenarios, they learned to transfer their responsibilities to other
operators. This adaptive strategy is clearly apparent in open-ended survey comments.
For example, after trial 38, the SD comments that “all team [1] members doing an
amazing job…Tanker and AOR doing well at hitting ground targets; Checkin doing great
at controlling airbase and assets, great help to the team” and after trial 41, SD commented
that Team 1’s “Checkin doing a great job at controlling two F18s and providing air
support for Tanker with his bombers and SO. Tanker is observant of what’s going on
with his teammates and does a good job alerting them to their fuel status in addition to
making several ground attacks”. In terms of Team 2, after trial 8, SD commented,
“Tanker is doing well at attacks with F18s, controlling multiple F18s and dividing
attention over entire AOR”. Similarly, after trial 29, Team 2’s AOR WD commented,
“Tanker is great at multi-tasking both refueling and bombing”. Thus, it appears that both
Teams learned how to transfer roles and responsibilities to cope with dynamic situation
constraints.
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Environmental contingencies promoted a third characteristic strategy
transformation across trials for both Teams that included re-configuring mission
priorities. First, both teams established goals to avoid enemy attack by discovering
consistent patterns in the environment that were believed to be linked to teams’ behavior.
Both teams noticed that at various times during missions, enemy aircraft ‘launched’ en
mass from enemy air bases. Teams discovered that by destroying enemy air bases early
enough, the number of enemy aircraft in the AOR would be greatly diminished. For
example, after trial 2, Team 1 comments that they should “focus on airbases more in the
start to decrease enemy fire and allow access to priority targets” and after trial 15, Team
2’s AOR WD commented, “although air bases were not high on the priority list, we set
those at a pretty high priority in order to disable enemy’s capability to launch bogeys.
Then, we attacked higher priority targets along the way”.
A second re-configuration of priorities occurred in response to enemy missile
launches from missed silo launch sites. Specifically, Teams discovered that during the
last minute of each fifteen-minute trial, a series of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs)
would be launched, destroying most of a team’s assets and prematurely ending their
mission. When teams discovered that destroying all missile launch sites would eliminate
the launch of TBMs, they formulated strategies for eliminating missile launch sites as
early as possible. For example, after trial 8, the SD commented that “missiles destroy too
many assets in the end. Has the possible effect of always making silos the top priority”
and after trial 19, Team 1 expressed “relief that all silos and all airbases were destroyed”.
Similarly, after trial 16, Team 2’s SO commented, “destroying silos and air bases greatly
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reduces enemy attacks,” and after trial 38, Team 2’s AOR WD comments, “it seems that
focusing on taking out silos and airbases is a good strategy”.
Summary. It appears that both Teams learned several adaptive strategies for
coping with mission demands. Qualitative evidence derived from open-ended surveys
suggests that both Teams learned to cluster their assets to exploit capabilities and support
vulnerabilities; transfer mission roles and responsibilities to more effectively meet
mission objectives; and re-prioritize targeting (i.e., enemy airbases and silo launch sites)
based on the impact of air enemies and theater ballistic missiles. In the next section, both
qualitative and quantitative evidence are discussed in relation to specific strategies Teams
employed for utilizing communication technologies. Specifically, how Teams utilized
radio, chat, and virtual whiteboard technology depended on the constraints of tasks and
degrees of freedom of the communication technology.
Strategies for communication technology use. During the experiment, both
Teams were provided radio, chat, and virtual whiteboard technologies to communicate
through. Agents were free to decide which medium to utilize for any specific situation.
How agents utilized each communication medium ultimately depended on the constraints
of the task. Thus, for tasks that required agents to remember specific information, such
as target locations that the SO communicated to WDs, both teams used the virtual
whiteboard (experimenter observation). For example, after trial 43, Team 2 commented,
“SO did well communicating where targets are and used the whiteboard effectively”. To
be sure, the bulk of virtual whiteboard use was attributed to the SO (see Figure 5.13). For
repetitive tasks that required ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses, such as having the SD respond to
(radio) permission requests from WDs, the chat medium was preferred by Team 1. In
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terms of comments related to chat usage, Team 1 suggest after trial 2 that “…SD to use
IM so to increase speed of communication” and, after trial 3 “all [members of Team 1]
agreed SD should continue to use IM”. Specifically, archived chat data (which, could not
be partitioned by Team) indicate that 1406 out of 2055 responses from the SD to both
teams were ‘yes’ responses (there were 2 ‘no’ responses; see below on study limitations).
The majority of remaining chats consisted of off-topic banter, indicating that the chat tool
was not extensively utilized by WD to cope with mission scenarios.
Teams 1 and 2 Mean Virtual Whiteboard Marks Per Trial
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14.33
SD=6.59

Mean Markings Per Trial

14.00
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6.00
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0.00
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Figure 5.13. Teams 1 and 2: means and standard deviations for virtual
whiteboard markings for each operator, per mission.
In contrast to chat and virtual whiteboard usage, it is clear that both teams
primarily utilized the radio to communicate through mission scenarios. Although, the
virtual whiteboard was utilized by both SOs to mark targets on the tactical display for
WDs, the virtual whiteboard is limited by the few symbols available to convey
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Team 1
Team 2

information. Additionally, operators commented on the virtual whiteboard clutter that
emerged on the tactical display. For example, after trial 10, the SD commented, “the
whiteboard gets cluttered at times occluding the targets. This makes it difficult to
determine if sensor rings are in range, if civilians are close, or to even verify where a
target is.”
On the other hand, the chat tool primarily was utilized by the SD to send
confirmation texts to WDs – the WDs did not utilize the chat modality to communicate
with each other. Perhaps, the utilization of the radio over the chat modality has
something to do with Wickens’ multiple resource theory (1984). Specifically, Wickens
proposes that individuals possess separate, limited pools of mental resources for spatial
and verbal information processing and that they utilize these resources independently or
jointly depending on the demands of the information processing components that
comprise a task. According to Wickens, due to the limitations of cognitive resources, an
individual cannot optimally process two or more competing visual and/or auditory tasks
at the same time (1984). Additionally, Wickens (2002) argues that time-sharing between
tasks that involve different modalities is more beneficial than intra-modal time-sharing.
During the present study, operators’ visual resources were required to vigilantly monitor
the situation display and to type and read chat messages during mission scenarios.
Therefore, operators may have preferred to ‘off-load’ information exchange to the
radio/auditory modality.
In the above sections strategy development and employment was discussed in
terms of interdependencies among agents (i.e., transferring roles and responsibilities and
asset clustering) and target prioritization (i.e., missile launch silos and enemy air bases).
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In the next section, the relationship between agent beliefs, outcome-related performance,
and constraint condition will be explored. Additionally, how correlations among agents
beliefs (i.e., situation awareness) corresponds to outcome-related performance will be
examined.
Agent Beliefs
Sarter and Woods define situation awareness as, “the accessibility of a
comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is continuously being updated
in accordance with the results of recurrent situation assessments” (1991; p. 52). Endsley
and colleagues (2003) define team situation awareness (i.e., shared SA) as the degree to
which team members have the same SA in a given situation. The authors propose that
the optimal team SA would entail congruent and accurate SA among team members – the
accuracy of team SA is contingent upon the accuracy of each team member’s SA. The
authors further argue that communication plays the key role of reducing potential
discrepancies between individual’s SA.
Based on the above definition of team situation awareness, both Teams’ beliefs
concerning outcome-related performance (i.e., number of ground targets eliminated and
number assets lost) were related to actual outcome-related performance across trials (see
Figure 5.14) to determine SA ‘accuracy’. Statistical analyses reveal significant
differences between belief and actual outcome-related performance measures for both
teams. Specifically, analyses indicate that both Teams consistently underestimated the
number of targets eliminated and the number of assets lost during each trial [Team 1:
Ground Targets: (Actual: M = 9.27, SD = 3.62; Belief: M = 7.15, SD = 1.66) t(44) = 5.80,
p < .05; Asset Losses (Actual: M = 14.18, SD = 3.87; Belief: M = 12.12, SD = 1.79) t(44)
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= 4.11, p < .05] and [Team 2: Ground Targets (Actual: M = 9.67, SD = 3.04; Belief: M =
6.28, SD = 1.83) t(44) = 12.71, p < .05; Asset Losses (Actual: M = 15.8, SD = 4.17;
Belief: M = 10.92, SD = 1.50) t(44) = 8.94, p < .05]. Thus, agents were consistently
inaccurate across all trials, i.e., agents had ‘low SA’.
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Figure 5.14. Teams 1 and 2: across trial periods, average team member
beliefs concerning outcome-related performance compared to actual
outcome-related performance by centralization condition.
A second component of the above definition of situation awareness is the degree
of similarity between operators’ and Teams’ beliefs concerning mission scenarios.
Specifically, determining discrepancies between operator and Team beliefs reveals who
is ‘out of touch’ with the Team. In terms of the qualitative shift in performance discussed
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earlier, we expected that Team 1’s Checkin WD’s beliefs to exhibit a stronger correlation
with Team 1’s beliefs than Team 2’s Checkin WD’s belief in relation to Team 2’s beliefs.
In other words, we expected that Team 2’s Checkin WD would be more ‘out of touch’
with their Team’s beliefs relative to Team 1’s Checkin WD because they were not
actively taking on other roles and they were not required to consistently pay attention to
what went on during mission scenarios. Each operator’s beliefs were correlated with
Teams’ beliefs concerning the number of ground targets eliminated and the number of
friendly assets lost (see Table 5.5). Results indicate that, in terms of ground targets
eliminated, Team 2’s operators exhibited stronger correlations with the Teams’ beliefs
than Team 1’s operators. In particular, contrary to what we expected, Team 2’s Checkin
WD’s beliefs exhibited a stronger correlation with the Teams’ beliefs than Team 1’s
Checkin WD. Thus, Team 2’s operators - including the Checkin WD - had higher team
‘SA’ than Team 1’s operators.
Table 5.5
Pearson-r Values for Teams 1 and 2: Relationship Between Operators’ and Teams’
Beliefs (Team ‘SA’)
Team

Operator

Ground Targets

Friendly Asset Losses

1

AOR WD

0.32 **

0.12

1

Checkin WD

0.66 ***

0.42 ***

1

Tanker WD

0.60 ***

0.47 ***

1

SO

0.42 ***

0.35 ***

2

AOR WD

0.85 ***

0.33 ***

2

Checkin WD

0.86 ***

0.73 ***

2

Tanker WD

0.78 ***

0.65 ***

2

SO

0.83 ***

0.41 ***

** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Summary. Results from the present study do not support a relationship between
agent accuracy, team performance, or congruency among agent beliefs. Although, we
expected a positive trend in agent accuracy across trials, results indicate that both Teams
were consistently inaccurate. Additionally, specific expectations concerning Team ‘SA’
and differences in mission engagement among Checkin WDs were not supported – the
Checkin WD that was most engaged in mission scenarios exhibited a weaker correlation
between their beliefs and their Team’s beliefs compared to the Checkin WD that was less
engaged in mission scenarios.
Summary of Teams’ Characteristics
Teams 1 and 2 exhibited different characteristics across experimental trials.
Relative to Team 1 that evolved aggressive strategies for coping with mission scenarios,
Team 2 was more conservative. Specifically, Team 2 deployed a single cluster of assets
across mission scenarios versus Team 1’s dual asset clusters; Team 2’s Checkin WD did
not assume other operator’s roles; and Team 2’s operator’s beliefs about mission
scenarios appear to be more in-line with their Teams’ beliefs than Team 1’s operator’s
beliefs. Thus, Team 2 did not attempt potentially risky strategies and operators were
more ‘in touch’ with the Team than Team 1 and its operators.
Although, both Teams experienced increased frustration when coping with
mission scenarios under centralized organizational constraints, Team 2 appears to have
experienced a significant perceived workload increase during centralized condition trials.
However, mixed results concerning organizational centralization do not support strong
conclusions about specific effects on either Team. Ultimately, across trials, both Teams
learned how to cope with dynamic and complex mission scenarios by evolving specific
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strategies, such as prioritizing the elimination of enemy air bases and missile launch silo
sites.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The friendly fire accident discussed in the introduction (see Chapter 1) reveals
that system failures occur despite typical agent behavior and theoretical predictions.
Scott Snook (2000), whom explores the dynamics of the friendly fire incident, argues that
one cannot focus solely on the technological complexity of (e.g., military) work domains,
as researchers within the Normal Accident tradition (e.g., Perrow, 1999) focus. Instead,
one must incorporate the perspective of High Reliability Organization researchers (e.g.,
Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) that focus on uncovering the underlying behavioral and
organizational dynamics inherent to the military work domain that can contribute to
Normal Accidents. Snook argues that the interrelationship between social and
technological dimensions coupled with dynamic, or continuously changing situations
creates work domains that are highly complex and that require reliable and adaptive
control solutions.
In the following sections, a definition of complexity will be reiterated (see Chapter
2), specifically, in terms of complex work domains. This will be followed by a reconsideration of the possibility and problem of control in complex work domains, such as
AWACS BMC2 (see Chapter 2). Finally, the empirical study elaborated above (see
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) will be discussed in terms of implications, limitations, and
directions for future work.
Complexity and Control
Complexity, as defined above, emerges from two facets, dimensionality (i.e., the
number of components or elements within a system) and coupling (i.e., slack or buffer
between components). For example, controlled experiments represent relatively low
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dimensional, tightly coupled environments. Experimental phenomena are deliberately
simplified and the tight coupling between stimuli and responses ensures that reliable
inferences can be made. Conversely, work environments such as the Air Operations
Center, AWACS BMC2, or operating rooms represent complex domains characterized by
high dimensionality and relatively loose coupling. For example, in the Air Operations
Center, diverse agents from different organizations with different technologies, must
work together both internally and externally to maintain control of an active battlespace.
Whereas observations and descriptions of organizations such as Air Operations centers
and operating rooms suggest that stable control is possible in complex work domains, it is
difficult to generalize from these observations without considering fundamental aspects
of control systems.
As discussed in Chapter 2, control is a relation of constraint of one element by
another (e.g., a pilot controls an aircraft). Control systems, such as AWACS BMC2 or
accounting firms, can be differentiated into control problems and control solutions,
wherein the control problem refers to the computations demands of a work domain and
the control solution refers to the organizational strategies for meeting those demands.
According to the law of requisite variety, the variety of any control solution must at least
match that of the control problem. Thus, in work domains such as assembly lines or
bricklaying, a single, optimal control solution can be developed to meet the requisite
variety of the work domain. However, the demands or variety of many complex work
domains require control solutions that can meet the demands of a variety of dynamic and
complex situations.
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Often, the variety exhibited by a control problem is massive and/or variable and
the control solution does not have enough variety to match it. Consider the number of
cells in the nervous system, and the number of muscles and joints throughout the human
body. How does the system coordinate purposeful behavior considering all of the
independent variables? In other words, how does the system maintain control over all of
its components, such that it can produce coordinated action? One solution to this
problem is to ascribe control to a centralized ‘program’ that manages all of the many
independent variables in a system. This is the classical approach to motor control. A
fundamental problem with this approach is that the massive number of degrees of
freedom that have to be managed cannot be computationally realized. In other words, it
is impossible for the brain to actively attend to and manage all of the variables required
for coordinated action. A second solution is to describe control as a condition that
emerges from specialized self-organizing functions that capitalize on the demands of
specific situations. This question as to how control over a multitude of independent
variables is maintained was initially deliberated by the motor control scientist Nicolai
Bernstein (1967), who presents it as the degrees of freedom (i.e., independent variable)
problem.
Bernstein attempts to resolve the degrees of freedom problem from the
perspective of motor control by arguing that the motor system simplifies things by
reducing the degrees of freedom by constraining them to act together. Specifically, the
process of coordination can be seen as the progressive mastery of multiple degrees of
freedom. According to Bernstein (1967), when an agent is first exposed to a motor task,
degrees of freedom are ‘frozen’, thus reducing the number of control constraints.
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Experimenting with fewer degrees of freedom affords a smaller number of directions of
stability that guides the coordination of additional degrees of freedom. For example,
when first learning to kick a ball, correctly timing when to flex and extend the hip, knee,
and ankle, and performing the correct range of motion to move each joint is difficult. To
‘solve’ this degrees of freedom problem the learner will ‘freeze’ his or her knee and ankle
and only change the angle of the hip. This strategy of movement organization results in a
straight leg kick, which is easier for the novice to perform, but does not allow the control
of the movements needed for a skilled kick. With practice the performer will begin to
‘release’ the degrees of freedom by moving the hip joint independently of the knee-joint,
and moving the knee-joint independently of the ankle-joint. Thus, degrees of freedom
are progressively released and incorporated into larger functional units called
coordinative structures (i.e,. functional assemblies of muscles, strategies, or behaviors for
specific patterns of coordination; Kugler et al., 1980). It is important to note that the
skilled ‘kicker’ or soccer player locks degrees of freedom out in a ‘smart’ way.
Specifically, the skilled kicker finds the strategy that allows coordination and control that
satisfies the particular domain constraints, as opposed to performing movements in a preprogrammed rote or ‘dumb’ way. Runeson (1977) calls specialized organizations (e.g., a
skilled soccer player) that capitalize on the unique features of situations and tasks, Smart
Instruments.
The abovementioned degrees of freedom problem also is faced in real-world work
domains. For example, in order for the U.S. Air Force to carry out a variety of critical
missions, specifically assigned forces must be organized through planning and directing
operations. This is known as air battle management (see Chapter 4). The Air Tasking
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Order, which is the published order that directs all air operations (i.e., assigning mission
tasking and detailing specific strategic targets) is transmitted to the AWACS, which
commands and control friendly assets in order to accomplish the mission objectives
outlined in the Air Tasking Order. In other words, the AWACS must actively manage all
fighter, bomber, refueling tankers, and sensor assets (e.g., UAVs) within a specified area
of responsibility in order to accomplish specific military objectives.
Weapons Directors onboard the AWACS are responsible for managing the variety
of friendly assets in order to accomplish mission objectives. Weapons Directors and the
SD work as a team to provide friendly forces with a ‘big picture’ of the battle-space;
assisting in finding, identifying, and destroying enemy targets, keeping track of friendly
assets, and coordinating air refueling. The AWACS WDs must coordinate the elimination
of enemy targets, asset re-fueling with tanker aircraft, and the close-air support (i.e.,
protection) of friendly assets. Additionally, in the AWACS BMC2 domain, like other
military domains, the control structure varies by platform. In a real-world AWACS
domain, the SD may be the only military officer among enlisted WDs. Therefore,
mission-specific actions must be approved by the SD; i.e., the AWACS unit is
characterized by centralization of command. In other circumstances, the WDs may be
officers and the SD may afford them the freedom to commit actions without approval;
i.e., in these cases, command is de-centralized. As discussed above, there are two ways
of managing complexity: through centralization and a command program or through decentralization and emergent behavior. Thus, an interesting research question is, How
does each proposed solution effect the performance of teams attempting to manage
complex mission situations? This question concerning AWACS BMC2 team’s
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management of variety under varying degrees of organizational centralization was
explored through the present study.
As mentioned above, organizations survive or maintain stability by constraining
the degrees of freedom intrinsic to a specific environment (and, visa versa). Indeed, the
management of variety is a general problem for all organizations. Through the present
study, both Teams evolved coordinative structures (i.e., asset clusters) to cope with
multiple friendly assets and complex and dynamic mission scenarios. Initially, Team 1
froze degrees of freedom (i.e., developed asset clusters) to cope with the variety of
friendly assets that needed to be coordinated to meet mission demands. However, after
evolving a two asset cluster strategy, degrees of freedom needed to be ‘released’ to cope
with increased coordination demands. Thus, Team 1’s coordinative structure evolved to
meet the demands of mission scenarios by expanding the Checkin WDs role.
Conversely, Team 2 froze degrees of freedom by constraining assets into one cluster.
Perhaps, by utilizing a single asset cluster, Team 2’s coordination demands did not
require the release of additional degrees of freedom; the Checkin WD may not have been
required to provide additional assistance. Accordingly, both Teams actively adjusted
degrees of freedom to the demands of emerging situations. In other words, both Teams
moved toward smart solutions.
As discussed earlier, specialized organizations, such as AWACS BMC2 teams,
that capitalize on the unique features of situations and tasks (i.e., modulate degrees of
freedom based on situational demands) are called smart instruments (Runeson, 1977). To
be sure, a fundamental characteristic of all life forms is compatibility with prevailing
constraints. In other words, (natural) organizations survive or maintain stability by
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constraining the degrees of freedom intrinsic to a specific environment (and, visa versa).
Conceptualizing skilled teams as smart instruments is a new way of thinking about team
performance through complex domains. By revealing how teams managed degrees of
freedom through a simulated AWACS BMC2 domain under varying centralization
constraints, the present study develops a foundation for further investigations into
coordinated activity.
Although, qualitative and quantitative data patterns from the present study
revealed the self-organization of two teams working through simulated AWACS BMC2
scenarios, there were some methodological limitations. The next sections will highlight
specific limitations of the present study and then discuss future directions for related
research.
Study Limitations
The present study suffered a number of limitations. First, the number of teams
involved in the study was limited to two. If more teams were involved in the study, a
greater number of statistical analyses with greater power to detect significant effects
within and between teams could have been employed. Indeed, two teams did not offer
the requisite statistical degrees of freedom to conduct between team analyses. However,
the goal of the present research was to understand the dynamics of individual teams as
opposed to increasing power across teams.
Second, the present study did not involve strong tests of hypotheses. Through
controlled experimentation, an independent variable is the only factor that varies
systematically whereas all confounding variables are eliminated. Additionally, through
controlled experimentation, a dependent variable ‘validly’ represents the phenomenon
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under study and is measured ‘accurately’. These tight constraints imposed through
controlled experiments might support testing a specific theory or help make particular
behavioral predictions; however, a major objective of this study was to observe the
emergence of complex global patterns in team behavior through a simulated BMC2
domain. This goal precluded the use of a completely controlled laboratory environment
as we did not want to overly constrain the behavioral possibilities of Teams. Thus, the
present study relied on observations of the performance variables of Teams under study,
rather than manipulating a few variables (although, organizational centralization was
manipulated). Unfortunately, the correlation among performance variables reduces the
reliability of the present study relative to what could be concluded if a controlled
experiment were performed.
A third limitation of the present study is that the centralization condition did not
present the same centralization constraints present in real-world AWACS BMC2
environments. In particular, the centralization condition turned out to be a minor
temporal constraint that Teams worked around with minimal effort (albeit, with some
frustration). Additionally, during the present study, the SD was not very involved in
mission scenarios - the majority of the SD’s time was spent responding ‘yes’ to WD
requests. The centralization condition could have been more representative of real-world
situations if it involved a greater degree of SD involvement. To be sure, in real-world
AWACS environments, the SD actively participates in BMC2 missions – especially,
during pre-emptive strike scenarios! The active involvement of the SD as a centralizing
constraint should create the type of bottleneck one would expect in real-world situations,
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wherein information must pass through a single, centralized ‘node’ prior to becoming
available.
A fourth limitation of the present study is related to the limitations of surveys.
Specifically, surveys tend to be weak on validity and strong on reliability. The post-hoc
and artificial nature of surveys puts a strain on validity because agents’ beliefs are hard to
understand after an experience and in terms of ratings on a scale. To counter the latter
problem, surveys for the present study included open-ended questions that afforded more
degrees of freedom for subjects to elaborate on responses. Conversely, surveys are
reliable in that they present subjects with a standardized stimulus, thus eliminating
unreliability in a researcher’s observations. Careful wording and empirical validation can
enhance the reliability and validity of surveys. However, only the NASA TLX has
undergone significant empirical validation (Hart & Staveland, 1988), whereas other
individual and team scale and open-ended items relating to performance were not
empirically validated.
A fifth limitation of the present study concerns ecological validity – does the STE
utilized in the present study adequately represent the dynamics and complexity present in
actual AWACS BMC2 domains? The answer is certainly, ‘no’ – but, the STE afforded a
non-reductionistic platform for observing team dynamics and self-organization. To be
sure, the STE engaged teams in mission scenarios based on real-world situations, which
promoted similar types of problem-solving, decision-making, and self-organizing
behaviors that one would expect on an actual AWACS. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the
STE performs as a research ‘bridge’ between naturalistic studies that are extremely
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difficult to carry out (especially, on an active AWACS) and controlled laboratory
experiments that over-simplify complex phenomena.
Although, the present study suffered several limitations, it provided a framework
for understanding team dynamics through a complex domain (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the
utilization of a STE with AWACS BMC2 scenarios based on real-world mission
constraints offered an excellent platform to observe the self-organization of team
behavior in response to continuously changing and challenging situations. Future
research, utilizing similar techniques, should focus on the particulars of self-organization
and the development of teams/organizations as smart instruments.
Future Directions
The principles by which the functional order of a self-organizing systems (e.g.,
AWACS BMC2 team) achieve dynamic stability provide a non-reductionist framework
for understanding how high reliability organizations adapt to situational demands. In
particular, the integrative action of an organization/team can not be understood as an
additive function of components, but as a relationally evolving organization emerging
from the requirements of constitutive parts. Therefore, in order to understand the
evolution of ‘smart’ solutions, future research involving self-organizing systems must
focus on the meaningful value, action, and information constraints of specific control
problems (see Chapter 2). In other words, future research seeking to understand how
highly reliable organizations continuously adapt to dynamic situations must study said
systems in ‘real’ (i.e., in situ) or synthetic environments that preserve the semantics of the
work domain.
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As mentioned above and in Chapter 2, the capacity of self-organizing systems
(e.g., high reliability organizations such as AWACS BMC2 teams) to adapt – i.e., to
develop smart mechanisms (Runeson, 1977), is embodied in the functional organization
of the control mechanism. Thus, to understand how smart instruments evolve and
survive, future research should focus on how agents and subsystems within dynamic
organizations communicate and how coupling and de-coupling of organizational
components and constraints results in the loss or gain of adaptive fitness. In other words,
future research should focus on how organizations self-organize around domain
constraints and modulate (‘freeze’ or ‘release’) degrees of freedom (i.e., variety) to meet
the demands of dynamic and complex situations. For example, how do teams from
different military branches (e.g., air force, marines) that manage a variety of friendly
assets (e.g., tanks, aircraft), working under de-centralized conditions, self-organize
around specific problematic situations – e.g., a defensive maneuver or time sensitive
targeting? How can particular information displays support effective self-organization?
Does the number of components affect the development of smart solutions? If so, how?
The self-organization of complex and divergent populations, such as a military C2
team, can be difficult and time consuming to emerge (Seel, 2001). Future research
should explore specific organizational conditions that could facilitate self-organization in
certain complex domains. For example, taking off where the present study leaves off, the
effects of organizational centralization should be studied more closely. From an
experimental perspective, during centralization conditions, the SD’s responses can be
constrained directly or the SD can be remotely located, thereby increasing time lags.
During the present study, time lag did not present a significant obstacle to coordination,
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however, future research should explore the effects of greater amounts of lag on team
performance. An additional approach to studying organizational centralization is through
promoting and examining self-organizing among AWACS Teams under more complex
conditions of SD constraint. For example, the SD can be incorporated in missions as
another degree of freedom (e.g., to take on alternative roles), allowing for new team
configurations to emerge.
Summary. It should be clear that the organization of behavior is a central concern
for science. Indeed, psychologists are interested in how agents (e.g., individuals, teams)
purposefully generate behavioral patterns that are tightly coordinated with the
environment. This production of stable and adaptive behavior is predicated on the
effective coordination of action within the constraints of a dynamic environment. The
present study explored the coordinated action of two AWACS BMC2 Teams engaged in
a dynamic battlespace. Through an evaluation of both Teams’ performance, patterns of
behavior were uncovered revealing organizational learning and coordination; selforganizing. It is the author’s hope that the results of the present study will contribute to
how psychologists and engineers think about, design, and develop socio-technical
systems.
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Appendix B

965th Airborne Air Control Squadron
The 965th Airborne Air Control Squadron is an operational unit of Air Combat Command’s 552nd
Air Control Wing, Tinker Air Force base, Okla.
Mission: The 965th AACS provides responsive employment of E-3 Airborne Warning and
Control aircraft for surveillance, warning and control in a variety of tactical, strategic and special
mission applications.
Distribution: F
2006-2007
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

141

I. Team Members:
1. Senior Director (SD): monitors the WD team, facilitates coordination b/w
WDs and generally makes sure mission stays on track. Also, is the officer that the
(often enlisted) WDs must get approval through to change plans or take out
targets. Many decisions are outside WDs authority. SD must be kept informed of
all unplanned events. The SD can provide the function of asking why WDs made
the decisions they did and record that info for analysis.
2. Weapons Director 1: Tanker WD: Primarily responsible for restocking
and refueling of friendly assets and monitors tanker high value assets. Informs the AOR
WD when an aircraft leaves tanker and re-enters the AOR, or when something happens
with the HVA that is not on the ATO. Also tells Check-in WD when tanker going back
to base.
3. Weapons Director 2: Area of Responsibility (AOR) WD: Informs the Tanker/HVA
WD when an aircraft is coming to a tanker for refueling/restocking, and tells the Checkin WD when an aircraft is leaving the AOR (e.g., going back to base). Primarily
responsible for F18 fighters (air-air) and B52 bombers (air-ground)
4. Weapons Director 3: Check-in WD: needs to identify and launch any aircraft taking
off from the base. Once finished, he ‘pushes’ (i.e., transfers) the aircraft to the AOR,
Tanker/HVA, or sensor operator frequency and tells the appropriate WD that this has
happened. The check-in WD also takes control of aircraft that are going back to base
5. Sensor Operator: Controls UAV sensor aircraft. Reports observed enemy
ground targets to WDs and relays coordinates.
II. Rules:
1. WD3 (Check-in WD) launches all friendly assets (UAV, F18, B52) from base. Assets must be
transferred to appropriate operator/WD: UAV to sensor operator; F18 and B52 to WD2 (AOR
WD).
2. Team must follow ATO.
3. Each WD has a primary responsibility (as outlined above). However, all WDs are familiar w/
other WDs responsibilities and periodic transfers of responsibility may be required due to
scenario demands. WDs can request a transfer of their assets/responsibilities to another WD.
Similarly, WDs can request another WDs assets/responsibilities.
III. AOR/Platform Characteristics:
• Enemy targets may be visible to all operators or not. In order to ‘see’/detect certain
targets, a special platform may be required.
o Most enemy ground targets will require a UAV to detect their location.
• The destruction of certain targets may require special platforms:
o Ground targets (e.g., missile launch silos) require strike packages (STRK)
 B52s are equipped w/ 4 STRK packages
 F18s are equipped w/ 1 STRK package
 UAVs are equipped w/ 0 STRK packages
 Tankers are equipped w/ 0 STRK packages
 The base is equipped w/ 0 STRK packages
o Air targets (e.g., MiGs) require combat air packages (CAPs)
 B52s are equipped w/ 0 CAP packages
 F18s are equipped w/ 4 CAP packages
 UAVs are equipped w/ 0 CAP packages
 Tankers are equipped w/ 0 CAP packages
 The base is equipped w/ 0 CAP packages

142

•

Each platform has a predetermined amount of fuel and arms that will need to be
replenished by either a tanker or base. Tanker restocking and refueling is a coordinated
activity.
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Scenario
ATO:
Overview/Background:
For the last decade, tensions have been high on the boarder between Country A and Country B.
Country A has accused Country B of developing weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological
weapons) and of crimes against humanity. It is believed that the biological weapons are being
stored in secret underground bunkers. Last week, Country B kidnapped two of Country A
soldiers. This act provoked outrage throughout Country A.
Mission:
The mission is to preemptively strike Country B and eliminate theater ballistic missile launch
sites before they strike Country A; destroy biological weapons manufacturing sites and the secret
bunkers that store stockpiles of manufactured weapons of mass destructions.
1. Prepare AOR for sensor, tanker, and bomber aircraft
2. Destroy enemy air bases
3. Destroy communication centers
4. Destroy bridges
5. Defeat enemy air forces
6. Destroy biological weapon manufacturing sites
7. Eliminate/protect HVAs from SAM sites
8. Eliminate WMD bunker storage sites
Rules of Engagement:
Entities and Roles:
• Command
o Coordinate, monitor, and supervise
o Utilization of all assets to define a situation
• Battle Management
o Execute ATO and mission objective through direct tasking and
coordination
o Assure that all tasks are destroyed
o Maintain a clear picture of all tracks in the AOR
o Prompt destruction of tasks
• Assessment
o Rapidly fuse and exploit surveillance and target data
o Request additional information if necessary
• Surveillance
o Build accurate picture of the AOR
o Effective collection of information from all entities in the AOR
• ISR Management
o Manage ISR constellation
o Assure no gap in ISR coverage
Tasks by Platform
Fighter Aircraft: based on Airbase in Country A (F18s)
1. Enemy fighter aircraft
2. Enemy ground targets
3. Protect friendly forces
4. Suppress enemy movements
Bomber Aircraft: based in Country A and on Airbase in Country A (B52s)
1. Enemy ground targets
2. Ground based enemy air defenses
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3. Enemy air bases
Sensor Aircraft: based on Airbase in Country A (UAVs)
1. Provide ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance)
2. Provide coordinate information about enemy ground targets
Tanker Aircraft: based in Country A
1. Provide fuel and arms for friendly assets
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Appendix C
965th Airborne Air Control Squadron
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

This image was captured over ‘Country B’ at 1400 hrs two weeks ago. Image reliability is
unknown.
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Appendix D
INDIVIDUAL BELIEF ASSESSMENT PT 1
Instructions: Please, complete the following regarding your name and position
Name:
Position: 1) AOR WD

2) Checkin WD

3) Tanker WD

4) SO

5) SD
Instructions: For each of the questions presented below, please write the number that
matches YOUR -or- your TEAM’s performance for the mission just completed
1. How many ground targets did YOU destroy during this mission?

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2. How many friendly assets did YOU lose during this mission?

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

3. How many ground targets did your TEAM destroy during this mission?

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

4. How many friendly assets did your TEAM lose during this mission?

0

5

10

15
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20

25

30

Instructions: For each of the questions presented below, please write the number that
matches YOUR -or- your TEAM MEMBER’s performance for the mission just
completed. Note: for questions 6, 7, & 8, do NOT respond if you are the position being
questioned (your performance is assessed in question 5).
5. How did YOU perform during this mission?

POOR

GOOD

6. How did Checkin WD perform during this mission?

GOOD

POOR

7. How did AOR WD perform during this mission?

POOR

GOOD

8. How did Tanker WD perform during this mission?

GOOD

POOR

9. How did the SO perform during this mission?

POOR

GOOD

10. How did the SD perform during this mission?

POOR

GOOD

11. How did your TEAM perform during this mission?

POOR

GOOD
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Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches YOUR experience with the mission just completed. *Please note that the
"Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to "poor" on the right
Mental Demand

Performance*

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0
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25

50

75

100

INDIVIDUAL BELIEF ASSESSMENT PT 2

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of Checkin WD’s workload for the mission your
team just completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the
left to "poor" on the right. Note: Do NOT respond if you are Checkin WD.
Mental Demand

Performance*

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0

25

50

75

100

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of AOR WD’s workload for the mission your team
just completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to
"poor" on the right. Note: Do NOT respond if you are AOR WD.
Mental Demand

Performance*

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0
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25

50

75

100

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of Tanker WD’s workload for the mission your team
just completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to
"poor" on the right. Note: Do NOT respond if you are Tanker WD.
Mental Demand

Performance*

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0

25

50

75

100

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of the SO’s workload for the mission your team just
completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to
"poor" on the right

Mental Demand

Performance*
High

Low

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0

25

50

75

100

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of the SD’s workload for the mission your team just
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completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to
"poor" on the right

Mental Demand

Performance*

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Good

100

Poor

0

25

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

High

0

25

High

50

75

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

100

Low

Temporal Demand

0

75

Effort

Low

0

50

Low

100

High

0

25

50

75

100

Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your individual perception of your TEAM’s workload for the mission your team
just completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from "good" on the left to
"poor" on the right
Mental Demand

Effort

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Low

100

High

0

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

Poor

0

High

50

75

100

25

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

75

Good

Temporal Demand

0

50

Performance*

Low

0

25

Low

100

High

0
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25

50

75

100

OPEN-ENDED QUESTION
To help facilitate the development of future training modules, please briefly summarize the mission
emphasizing what you consider to be the critical lessons learned. Try to give specific examples that
illustrate either expert performance or areas where improvements could be made. What things were
done well and should be continued in the future? What things need to be improved?
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TEAM BELIEF ASSESSMENT PT 1
Instructions: Please, complete the following regarding team number
Team Number: 1

2

Instructions: For each of the questions presented below, please write the number that
matches your TEAM’s performance for the mission just completed

1.

How many ground targets did your TEAM destroy during this mission?

2.

How many friendly assets did your TEAM lose during this mission?

3. How did your TEAM perform during this mission?

GOOD

POOR
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TEAM BELIEF ASSESSMENT PT 2
Instructions: For each of the scales presented below, please write the number that
matches your TEAM’s perception of the TEAM’s workload and performance for the
mission your team just completed. *Please note that the "Performance" scale goes from
"good" on the left to "poor" on the right
Mental Demand

Effort

Low

High

0

25

50

75

Low

100

High

0

Physical Demand
High

25

50

75

100

Poor

0

High

50

75

100

25

50

75

100

Frustration

Low

25

75

Good

Temporal Demand

0

50

Performance*

Low

0

25

Low

100

High

0

25

50

75

100

OPEN-ENDED QUESTION
To help facilitate the development of future training modules, please briefly summarize the
mission emphasizing what you consider to be the critical lessons learned. Try to give specific
examples that illustrate either expert performance or areas where improvements could be made.
What things were done well and should be continued in the future? What things need to be
improved?
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Sensor Operator

Check-in WD

